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ABSTRACT
Following the demobilization at the end of World War II, the
firms from the traditional aircraft industry have experienced a sub-
stantial increase in level of activity and a rapidly changing technol-
ogical, competitive, economic and market environment. Many of the
characteristics of this period would seem analogous to conditions
which may prevail during the 1960's. The purpose of this paper is to
evaluate the financial operations and policies of several major firms
in the industry during the past decade in the hope that such an anal-
ysis may provide guides to appropriate financial policy during the
next decade.
The analysis presented in this paper focuses upon corporate
sources and uses of funds as indicated by changes in year end balance
sheet accounts. The data were derived from corporate reports pub-
lished annually by the firms studied, supplemented by information pub-
lished by the several investors services. Eight major firms from the
traditional aircraft industry were selected for study, four of them
(Boeing, Douglas, Lockheed and North American) being relatively large
firms and the other four (Grumman, Martin, McDonnell and Northrop)
representing a much smaller scale of operations as measured by sales
and assets utilized. In addition to the analysis of patterns of fund
flow per se, mathematical models of the rate of adjustment in dividend
payout to changes in levels of earnings; the relationship between
stock market price and dividends and retained earnings; and the cost
of capital and retained earnings were utilized to examine the relation-
ship among related flows.
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Generally, the behavior of the groups of large and small firms
was similar in many areas, although considerable differences were
found among policies at the level of the individual firms. With re-
spect to internal sources and uses of funds, it was found that these
were generally adequate to finance an expanding level of operations
through the mid-1950's, but that after that time, decreased levels of
earnings combined with increased requirements for fixed asset in-
vestments forced most firms to seek external fund supplies. In gener-
al, the dividend payout policies of the aircraft firms have been more
conservative than for the corporate universe as a whole. The over-all
rate of adjustment in dividend policy to changes in levels of earnings
was somewhat higher than for other groups which have been studied on a
similar basis. Also, the dependency of stock market price upon current
dividends was substantially greater than upon retained earnings and
much higher, comparatively, than for other industrial groups.
Externally supplied funds were obtained principally through the
issuance of long term sinking fund debentures. These debentures were
rated rather low from an investment risk point of view, carried compar-
atively high effective interest rates and contained a substantial num-
ber of restrictions in the indentures limiting the future financial
flexibility of the firms involved. An analysis of the leverage posi-
tion of these bonds as compared to stock issues of comparable size
indicated that bonds were advantageous only at a relatively high earn-
ings level as compared to the average experience from 1955-59.
Average cost of capital since World Wdar II averaged about 16
per cent for the eight aircraft firms studied as compared to about 12
per cent for Moody's 125 Industrials on a comparable basis. The aver-
age return on investment was found to have averaged slightly higher
than 16 per cent, with the ratio of return on investment to cost of
capital steadily improving over the period studied, indicating an in-
creasingly effective use of funds with respect to market criteria for
return on investment.
The general conclusion regarding appropriate future financial
policy resulting from these analyses is predicated upon the fact that
the existing capital structure will require a relatively high average
earnings level during the next ten years in terms of probable future
return on investment criteria. Accordingly, dividend policy should
be predicated upon relatively high payout ratios unless future earn-
ings can be expected to be substantially above past average experience.
If, however, future earnings can reasonably be expected to be substan-
tially above past average experience, then the alternative of high
earnings retention would seem justified, considering the relatively
low long term debt tolerance of the aircraft firms.
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Chapter I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This paper deals with the financial activities of se-
lected firms from the traditional aircraft industry during
the period 1948-1959. During this period, the industry
faced not only a substantial expansion in total level of
activity, but a rapidly changing technological, competitive,
economic and market environment as well. It would appear
likely that activity in the industry will continue at rela-
tively high levels for some time to come and that the 1960fs
will be equally dynamic from the competitive and technolog-
ical points of view. Based upon this premise, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that many of the financial problems to be
faced by the industry during the 1960's will be analogous to
similar problems encountered during the 1950's. The purpose
of this study is to evaluate the impact of these problems
upon the financial policies and operations of several major
firms in the industry in the hope that such an analysis may
assist in determining appropriate financial policies in the
future.
I. BACKGROUND
In one sense, the problems faced by the aircraft in-
dustry during the 1950's were not new. Since its inception
min
2in the early part of this century, the aircraft industry has
developed in an economic and market environment of substan-
tial secular growth, coupled with cyclical swings of large
relative amplitude. In the main, the major cyclical swings
have been related to the needs of national defense. From
1914 to 1919, the total value of aircraft and parts produced
increased from an annual rate of $790 thousand to $14.4 mil-
lion. From 1939 to 1944, the same index of activity in-
creased from $279 million to over $16 billion. From 1949 to
1959, sales of manufacturers of complete aircraft, engines,
propellers and parts increased from $1.8 to $11.3 billion. 1
During the intervening years, the secular trend was general-
ly upward as technological development and commercial utili-
zation have increased.
With more specific reference to the period since
World War II, the end of the war brought a rush for disarm-
ament, resulting in wholesale military contract termina-
tions, leaving the industry with comparatively small mili-
tary order backlogs and with substantial overcapacity in
terms of foreseeable commercial needs. In 1948, order
lAerospace Industries Association, Aviation Facts and
Figures, ed. Ben S. Lee (Washington: American Aviation Pub-
lications, Inc. 1959) pp. 8-9; United States Bureau of the
Census, Backlog of Orders for Aircraft Companies, Summary
for 1959, (Washington: March I960) p. 3.
3backlogs reported by manufacturers of complete aircraft,
engines, propellers and parts were slightly over 43 billion,
only about two and one-half months' production at previous
2
wartime rates.
The period since 194.8 has witnessed three significant
developments which have had a marked impact upon the air-
craft industry. First, the coming of the Korean War and the
subsequent continuing "cold war" status have substantially
increased the over-all requirements of the military market.
Second, the rapid development of missile and space technol-
ogy during the past decade has altered the traditional role
of the aircraft manufacturer. Third, commercial aviation
came of age as a means of mass transportation, leading to
the procurement of new commercial equipment on a large
scale. In combination, these three major factors have had a
profound impact upon the character of the market served by
the traditional aircraft manufacturers, upon the competitive
structure within the industry, and upon the related problems
of financial management of individual firms.
II. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS
For purposes of evaluating the impact of the forego-
ing factors, four of the "big five" firms (Boeing, Douglas,
2Aerospace Industries Association, op.cit., pp. 8-10.
4
Lockheed and North American) for which data is available, 3
and four of the next smaller firms (Grumman, Martin,
McDonnell and Northrop) were selected for detailed study as
being representative of firms from the traditional aircraft
industry.
The analysis presented in this paper will focus upon
corporate sources and uses of funds as indicated by changes
in year end balance sheet accounts. Essentially, therefore,
the data presented herein are derived from the annual re-
ports published by these firms, supplemented by information
published by the several investor's services. As such, the
financial data are limited to the information which is
available to the general public.
The principal research for this paper consisted of an
examination of annual corporate reports for each of the
firms studied. Year end changes in balance sheet accounts
for the period 1948-1959 were reconciled in terms of sources
and uses of funds statements, based upon information con-
tained in operating statements or elsewhere in these re-
ports. These data were then analyzed utilizing a variety of
statistical ratio, correlation and regression techniques, in
Convair, formerly Consolidated Vultee, the other
large aircraft producer, became a division of General
Dynamics in 1954 and has not published separate financial
data since that time.
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conjunction with mathematical models of certain fund flow
behavior patterns.
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The principal operational and institutional charact-
eristics affecting the aircraft industry during the period
1948-1959 were outlined briefly in the preceding paragraphs.
The analysis of the financial posture resulting from this
environment, which is presented in succeeding chapters of
this paper, may be summarized in terms of several signifi-
cant trends which characterize this period from the point of
view of financial operations and policy.
From 1948-1959, over-all sales increased approximate-
ly 870 per cent, total assets utilized increased about
500 per cent and net worth increased about 350 per cent.
Approximately 80 per cent of total funds required to support
these increases were supplied from internal operations. Of
this amount, about 60 per cent was derived from earnings and
20 per cent from depreciation. The major uses of these
funds were for dividends, 25 per cent; purchase of plant and
equipment, 43 per cent; increases in other assets, 2 per
cent; and increases in net working capital, 30 per cent.
The pattern of internal fund sources, consisting of
earnings and depreciation, permitted increases in dividend
U1 -
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payments to be made and in addition supplied nearly all
funds required for purchase of plant and equipment and for
increases in net working capital through the mid-1950's.
Declines in both the rate and absolute amount of earnings
during the latter 1950's, concurrent with an increase in net
asset requirements, caused the aircraft firms to reduce
dividend payments and resort to external sources of funds.
The principal source of external funds was the issue
of both straight and convertible sinking fund debentures.
These debentures were rated rather low (Baa and Ba), carried
relatively high effective interest rates and contained many
provisions in the indentures which place various restric-.
tions upon financial operations. By 1959, the long term
debt to equity ratio had increased from virtually zero in
1954 to approximately 26 per cent, as the result of the
debentures and other long term note financing.
The fund flow patterns outlined in the foregoing
paragraphs were evaluated with respect to salient policy
considerations involved. The analyses made relating to
dividend policy indicated that, in general, the aircraft
firms were more conservative than U. S. corporations as a
whole. Dividend payout ratios, while varying widely among
individual firms, averaged about 40 per cent for the air-
craft companies as compared to 50 per cent for all U. S.
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corporations, although the rate of adjustment of dividend
payments to changes in levels of earnings was generally
higher than for other industries which have been studied on
a similar basis.
The effect of the foregoing policies upon the market
price of common stock was evaluated by means of a regression
analysis of the relative dependence of price upon dividends
and retained earnings. The results of this analysis, al-
though subject to qualification, indicated a much higher
degree of dependence of price upon dividends than upon re-
tained earnings. Relatively, the ratio of the dependence
upon dividends to dependence upon retained earnings was much
higher, generally, than for other industrial groups studied
in a similar way by others.
The relative leverage of debt versus equity financing
by the aircraft firms was evaluated with respect to the
range of earnings with which the sale of bonds would be more
or less advantageous than the sale of stock in a similar
amount. It was generally found that the sale of stock was
more advantageous through a range of earnings up to a point
somewhat above average earnings for the period 1955-1959.
Beyond this point, the bond issue could be expected to pro-
vide greater earnings per share than the stock issue.
8The analysis of the cost of capital and the return on
investment for the aircraft firms suxmarizes the effect of
the financial policies and operations discussed separately
in the foregoing paragraphs. In general terms, it was found
that the average cost of capital was approximately 16 per
cent and that the average return on investment was slightly
higher for the aircraft firms during the period 1948-1959.
These percentages compare to significantly lower figures for
Moody's 125 Industrials of 11.9 per cent and 13.8 per cent,
respectively, computed on a comparable basis. It is signif-
icant, however, that the ratio of return on investment to
cost of capital for the aircraft firms has increased fron
about 70 per cent in 1948 to about 120 per cent, indicating
an increasingly effective use of funds throughout this
period.
No attempt has been made to forecast either the fu-
ture levels of activity which may be expected in the air-
craft industry or the future levels of earnings which may
result therefrom. However, as noted earlier, it would be
reasonable to assume that activity would continue at rela-
tively high levels during the next decade. The analyses
outlined in the foregoing paragraphs provide some general
guidelines for future financial policy consistent with this
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9assumption. In the main, the conclusions regarding appro-
priate future policy deal with the related subjects of re-
quired levels of earnings with respect to the present cap-
ital structure and the rate of return on investment; the
potential impact of alternative dividend policies with re-
spect to return on investment and the liquidity position of
the firm; and the implications of long term debt versus
equity financing.
For purposes of illustration, data relating to the
four largest firms studied have been used to outline the
general conclusions reached on the subjects mentioned above.
However, similar conclusions are applicable to the group of
small firms as well, recognizing that differences among in-
dividual firms in both groups would not make these conclu-
sions equally applicable at the level of the individual firm.
Based upon the present capital structure of the four
large firms of approximately 700 million, and an assumed
range of requirements for return on investment from 12.5 -
17.5 per cent, required future earnings levels would range
from 87.5 million, slightly less than the 1955-59 average,
to about $122.5 million. Assuming that some earnings are
retained, the range of required earnings increases to $92 -
$131 million for a 60 per cent dividend payout policy and
from $95 - $138 million for a 30 per cent payout policy. It
10
may be seen that the assumptions about future earnings levels
or required rates of return on investment are much more crit-
ical than differences in dividend policy.
These data suggest that if the expectation of future
earnings is marginal with respect to the average of the
range of requirements for return on investment postulated
above, then a high dividend payout policy is desireable if
the position of the stockholder is to be maximized. This
is particularly true in view of the historically high de-
pendence of aircraft stock prices upon current dividends.
If the prospect for higher levels of activity and increased
earnings is relatively good, however, higher earnings
retentions would seem justified. Recent trends in the
increased percentage of net worth invested in fixed assets
and increased requirements for working capital would suggest
that unless additional funds are provided by this means,
the liquidity position of the aircraft firms would deter-
iorate in a manner similar to the experience of the industry
in the middle 19501s. In either event, however, it would
seem that future financial policy should be predicated upon
conservative estimates of future long run expectations from
an investment point of view. Should this conservative view
prove to be too pessimistic, the option of further recourse
to external sources of funds would appear feasible.
11
With respect to future requirements for externally
supplied funds, it seems clear that the long term debt tol-
erance of the aircraft firms is relatively low. Further,
the earnings levels at which long term debt is advantageous
are relatively high as compared to stock issues of compar-
able size. Additional debt issues would tend to raise these
levels. It would appear, therefore, that financial policy
with respect to long term financing should be directed pri-
marily toward equity issues.
IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
A more detailed evaluation of the above major factors
is set forth in the remainder of this paper. In order to
place the industry in context with its general economic and
market environment, Chapter II presents aggregate measures
of size and rate of growth as compared to the economy as a
whole. These data are intended to provide over-all back-
ground information concerning the industry, against which
the following more specific analyses may be evaluated.
Chapter III introduces the evaluation of corporate
fund flows with some general data relating the posture of
the specific firms selected for study to the aircraft indus-
try, together with comparative data on over-all patterns of
growth and aggregate sources and uses of funds. Chapter IV
12
presents a more detailed analysis of internal fund flows,
principally earnings, dividends, fixed asset investment and
depreciation. Various correlation and regression analyses
are made of the relationships among these elements, based
upon models of dividend policy and the relationship of mar-
ket price to earnings and dividends suggested in current
literature. External fund sources, sale of stock and long
term debt, are examined in Chapter V. Chapter VI brings the
foregoing separate evaluations of fund flows together in
terms of an analysis of cost of capital and return on
investment. A summary of these findings is presented in
Chapter VII. Appended to this paper is a bibliography of
source and reference material, together with summary sources
and uses of funds data derived during the course of this
investigation.
Chapter II
ECONO4IC AND MARKET ENVIRONMENT
As briefly noted in the introductory chapter, the
traditional aircraft industry has undergone substantial
change during the period 1948 to the present, both with re-
spect to the economy as a whole and in its internal struc-
ture. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the general
nature and magnitude of this changing posture.
I. ECONOMIC COMPARISONS
As an indication of comparative position in the eco-
nomy, Figure II-1 shows the relative growth of GNP, defense
expenditures and aircraft industry sales. 4 These data are
shown for the period 1939-59 in order to compare recent ex-
perience with the status of the industry during the World
War II cycle. The percentage data in the lower chart are
plotted using 1948 as the base period.
The severe cyclical nature of the industry, largely
in response to defense requirements, is readily apparent
from these data. It will be noted that the aircraft and
missile series is subject to relatively greater percentage
4Economic Report of the President (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1961) p. 127; Aerospace Indus-
tries Association, op.cit., p. 8; United States Bureau of
the Census, loc.cit.
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variations than are total defense expenditures. Both series
are lower in the 1950 cycle than in the World War II cycle.
Adjusted for increases in the general wholesale price level
between 1944 and 1959, the latter amounts would be approx-
imately 55 per cent of the levels indicated. In absolute
terms, military expenditures accounted for approximately
9 per cent of GNP in 1959, of which about one-fourth or
slightly in excess of 2 per cent of GNP was expended for
aircraft and missiles.
II. MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
In addition to the strictly statistical measures of
comparative level of activity noted above, there are several
institutional characteristics of the post World War II cycle
which bear an important relationship to the financial impli-
cations of the growth involved. The first of these is the
productive capacity with which the cycle began. Although
reliable quantitative measures of defense plant capacities
are generally classified for security reasons, it is readily
apparent that substantial excess capacity existed at the be-.
ginning of the upswing in 1948, at least in general terms.
Annual sales value of airframes produced in 1948 was only
3.7 per cent of the World War II peak, for example. 5 It may
5Aerospace Industries Association, loc.cit.
=NEI
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be concluded, therefore, that in such general terms as total
covered floor area and basic machine tool capacity, the pro-
duction buildup did not require substantial additions to
plant and equipment.
While this factor is important in analyzing capital
investment requirementmas related to sales growth, for ex-
ample, it overlooks the qualitative implications of new
technologies introduced during the post World War II period.
These changes involved new materials and processes, size and
complexity of product, revisions in functional product mix
(e.g., electronics versus airframe hardware), the mix of re-
search, development and production, and the change in the
character of the work force (white collar versus blue col-
lar). All of these factors relate, in varying degrees, to
requirements for plant and equipment modernization or new
equipment purchase. No attempt will be made to analyze the
specific nature of these changes in detail here. However,
the upper chart on Figure 11-2 indicates the growing import-
ance of missiles over the past decade. 6
Accompanying the differences in technologies as be-
tween aircraft and missiles has come a change in the compet-
itive structure of the military market. Until the missile
era, the airframe manufacturer enjoyed the dominant technical
6Ibid., p. 41.
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and sales position in the military market. The vehicle and
its related airborne equipment, carrying a payload under
direct manned control, was the most important element of the
system in terms of size, value and comolexity. In the mis-
sile and space era, however, the end use vehicle often is
the smallest, least costly and least complex of any of the
elements of the system. Large scale liquid and solid rocket
engines, automatic guidance and control and ground launch
and control complexes have assumed the dominant position.
As a result, chemical firms, electronic firms and construc-
tion firms having technical specialties in these areas have
become direct competitors of the aircraft manufacturers for
a large share of the military procurement dollar. Accord-
ingly, the aircraft manufacturers have been forced to expand
the scope of their traditional role into new areas of com-
petency, either by acquisition or internal diversification.
The commercial sector of the aircraft market has in-
creased substantially in absolute dollar magnitude through-
out the last decade, although at a less rapid rate than
military procurement. The lower portion of Figure 11-2
shows the relative rates of growth between total aircraft
sales since 1948. During this period, annual sales of
7Federal Aviation Agency, FAA Statistical Handbook,
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959) p. 62;
Bureau of the Census, Complete Aircraft and Aircraft Engines,
Summary for 1959 (Washington: March 1960) p. 2.
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civilian aircraft have increased in the order of four-five
times. In terms of impact upon the industry the commercial
market has had a much greater effect upon the large compan-
ies than upon the smaller firms being studied. The increase
in commercial aircraft sales represents a substantial poten-
tial hedge against the vagaries of the defense business. To
the extent that this potential is realized, the development
of this market represents a long term stabilizing factor in
the industry.
Offsetting this apparent advantage, however, are the
increased risk and financing requirements involved in the
commercial aircraft business. This increased risk results
largely from differences in procurement procedures in the
commercial sector wherein the manufacturer must finance the
total direct product development cost, as opposed to sub-
stantial government participation in military projects;
fixed price contracting as opposed to various full or par-
tial cost recovery forms of contracting common to much mili-
tary procurement; and by lesser relative progress payments
on commercial work-in-process. However, while the risk is
increased in the commercial sector, the opportunity for
greater profit margins also exists in the commercial sector
where profit rates are not limited by procurement regula-
tions and statutory recovery under contract renegotiation.
20
Another factor worthy of note is the relatively sus-
tained period of the post World War II cycle as compared to
prior periods, both in fact and expectation. The World
War II cycle lasted some seven to eight years from valley to
valley. The expectation during this period was that the
production buildup would be accomplished, the war would be
won, and the economy would then return to a state of "peace-
time normalcy," implying a low level of defense-related ef-
fort. Since the early 1950's, however, the state of normal-
cy is conceived to be of an entirely different nature. Thus
far, the continuing cold war status has implied a sustained
and continuing need for a relatively high level of defense
expenditures, not only to produce a current defense arsenal,
but more important, to continue a rapid pace of technologi-
cal innovation in defense weaponry.
While always vulnerable to a change in the level of
tension in international affairs, and considering variations
in individual estimates, the expectation in recent years
seems to have been that the long run requirements of nation-
al defense would continue to increase, although at a less
rapid rate than GNP. In terms of assessing future risk, and
in relating this assessment to the problems of financial
management, cautious though positive expectations of the
aircraft industry have been predicated upon a more stable
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future in the military market sector and at a much higher
level of activity, than at any period in its history.
III. SUMMARY
In summary, the economic and market environment of
the aircraft industry during the period since 1948 has been
dharacterized by a substantial over-all increase in the lev-
el of activity in both the military and commercial sectors.
The greatest increase, both in absolute and relative terms,
has been in the military sector. The basic productive cap-
acity developed during World War II has required substantial
modifications and additions to meet changing qualitative re-
quirements resulting from a rapidly developing technological
change. The method of buildup during the past decade has
been predicated upon the expectation of a more stable future
at relatively high levels, a result, primarily, of the con-
tinuing cold war status. The substantial increases in the
commercial market have increased opportunity for long-term
stability as a hedge against the uncertainty of the military
market, but have been accompanied by increased requirements
for financing and increased profit risk, both short- and
long-run.
---1
Chapter III
SIZE, GROWTH AND AGGREGATE FUND FLOWS
The major economic and market conditions affecting
the aircraft industry since World War II were outlined in a
brief and general way in the last chapter. The purpose of
this chapter is to evaluate the general position of the
eight firms selected for study within the context of the
aircraft industry. For this purpose, general measures of
relative size, sales and asset growth and over-all sources
and uses of funds are analyzed for the period 1948-1959.
I. INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION AND SIZE
The aggregate aircraft industry data utilized in the
previous chapter reflect the definition of the industry
listed under tne Standard Industrial Classification Codes
3721, 3722, 3723 and 3729 which include manufacture of com-
plete aircraft engines, propellers and parts.8 Over 1,500
firms reported their operational data under this classifica-
tion in 1958. Of more specific interest for this study is
the aircraft manufacturing subdivision of this category,
SIC 3721 and aircraft equipment, SIC 3729, which includes
missiles.
8Bureau of the Budget, Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion Manual (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1957)
p. 113.
---------- a -- - -_
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Of the firms included in the latter two categories,
twelve are classified as "Major Firms" by the Aero-Space
Industries Association, the national trade association of
the industry, for purposes of compiling a variety of statis-
tical data representing industry position and trends.9 A
cursory examination of these data indicates, however, that
the group is sharply divided in magnitude of operations be-
tween the four largest and the eight smaller firms. In gen-.
eral, however, the four largest firms are within the same
size range, as are the eight smaller. The limits of these
ranges and relative position in the economy are indicated
by the following table of rank in the 1959 Fortune "500."1
9Aerospace Industries Association, o2.cit., p. 83.
10"The 500 Largest U.S. Corporations," Fortune, LXII,
No. 1 (July, 1960), pp. 131-150.
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TABLE III-1
POSITION OF 12 LARGEST AIRCRAFT FIRMS IN THE
500 LARGEST U. S. CORPORATIONS
Boeing
Lockheed
North American
Douglas
Martin
McDonnell
Grumman
Northrop
Chance Vought
Republic
Bell
Fairchild
SALES
Rank $ Mill.
19 1,612.2
28 1,301.6
38 1,044.9
46 883.9
84 523.7
100 435.9
150 280.0
182 262.8
188 254.7
228 198.1
314 128.1
350 114.1
Rank
63
75
96
82
192
238
323
285
304
300
367
462
ASSETS
$ Mill.
595.3
521.1
380.6
459.9
180.8
145.5
93.9
109.0
101.0
102.9
79.4
52.2
The above twelve firms accounted for approximately 74 per
cent of the sales in the aircraft and related services in.-
dustry during 1959.11 In terms of defense contracting, the
five largest firms listed above occupied five of the top
seven positions in rank of 1959 contract awards.
1 1Bureau of the Census, o.cit., P. 3.
L
- - - - 1
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For purposes of this study, the eight largest firms
in the foregoing list were selected for detailed analysis.
This selection encompasses a substantial segment of the in-
dustry, representing about 90 per cent of the sales achieved
by the twelve major firms in 1959, or approximately 67 per
cent of the sales in the aircraft and related services in-
dustry as a whole. The firms within each group were found
to represent a considerable diversity as to scope and size
of operations, product mix, capital structure and financial
policy. For analytical purposes, the group of eight firms
were divided into two categories, based upon sales and asset
size, called large firms (Boeing, Douglas, Lockheed and
North American) and small firms (Grumman, Martin, McDonnell
and Northrop), respectively throughout the balance of this
paper. This selection permits comparisons of policy not
only among individual firms but also among the groups of
large and small firms. The data necessary for the contem-
plated analyses are available for each of these firms on a
consistent basis throughout the period of interest.
II. GROWTH IN SALES, ASSETS AND NET WORTH
As a first step in the analysis of the financial
activities of these firms, it is useful to consider their
rates of growth in terms of three measures, namely, sales,
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total assets and net worth, representing their principal
source of revenue and the utilization of resources to pro-
duce that revenue. These data are plotted on Figures III-1,
111-2 and 111-3 for the groups of large and small firms.
The most striking fact evident from these comparisons is the
relatively slower rate of growth in total assets and net
worth as compared to sales. Two sets of comparisons are of
interest with respect to these data, namely, the relative in-
crease in the sales, total assets and net worth series con-
sidered individually and the changes in ratios of sales to
total assets, sales to net worth and total assets to net
worth. Table 111-2 sets forth the first of these comparisons.
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TABLE 111-2
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN SALES, TOTAL ASSETS AND NET WORTH
(1948-49 to 1958-59)
Large Firms Total
Boeing
Douglas
Lockheed
North American
Small Firms Total
Grumman
Martin
McDonnell
Northrop
Sales
862
804
866
931
890
Total Assets
491
504
459
635
382
874
510
8o8
1646
941
506
223
436
1274
1002
Net Worth
334
454
215
316
423
397
185
415
1121
833
As a whole, the comparisons between the large and small
groups of firms show remarkable similarity. The percentage
increase in sales averaged about 870 per cent, the percent-
age increase in total assets approximately 500 per cent, and
the percentage increase in net worth, about 360 per cent.
Within each group, however, there is a wide variation in
pattern..
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In the large firm group, Lockheed shows the
largest percentage increase in sales, 931 per cent and total
assets, 635 per cent, but less than average increase in net
worth. Boeing, on the other hand, shows the smallest in-
crease in sales, 804 per cent but the largest increase in
net worth, 454 per cent. The patterns for small firms show
an even more diversified, though more consistent pattern by
company, than the large firms. Grumman shows the lowest
percentage increases in sales, 510 per cent; total assets,
223 per cent; and net worth, 1b5 per cent. The data for
McDonnell reflect the highest rates of growth in all three
categories, 1046 per cent for sales, 1274 per cent for total
assets and 1121 per cent for net worth. Table 111-3 pre-
sents these same data in ratio form, comparing the relation-
ships among sales, total assets and net worth in 1940-49 and
1958-59.
_--_I
TABLE 111-3
RATIOS AMONG SALES, TOTAL ASSETS AND NET WORTH
Sales/Total Assets
194.-49
Large Firms, Total
Boeing
Douglas
Lockheed
North American
Small Firms, Total
Grumman
Martin
McDonnell
Northrop
142
174
116
150
121
163
128
151
228
270
195b-59
249
277
219
220
282
281
292
280
295
254
Sales/Net Worth
1940-49
266
458
161
271
238
310
190
343
605
575
195d-59
685
811
649
799
500
682
667
889
650
Total Assets/Net Worth
1940 -49
188
264
139
181
197
191
149
227
265
213
195d-59
275
293
296
363
177
243
180
238
301
256
N
1i1 iniiin -
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Again, the marked similarity is noted in over-all
comparisons between the large and small groups of firms.
The ratios of sales to total assets has increased about 1.7
times from the late 1940's to the late 1950's, the ratios of
sales to net worth an even greater amount, approximately 2.4
times and the ratios of total assets to net worth about 1.4
times. The increase in ratios of sales to total assets is
indicative of an increasing effectiveness in asset utiliza-
tion to produce revenue. This is probably due to a combina-
tion of four principal factors, namely, the over-capacity
status of the industry with which the period began; the high
percentage of progress payments received on military work in
process; increasing amounts of subcontracting by the major
firms; and the increasingly effective use of government fur-
nished facilities during this period, the value of which do
not appear in the asset base. It is significant to note,
however, that none of the firms is outstandingly different
from their respective group averages. This lends some val-
idity to comparisons among these firms for which adjustments
of these factors cannot be made on an equitable basis.
The sales to net worth and total asset to net worth
ratios are more meaningful in evaluating differences among
firms as to composition of asset structure. Low percentages
in these measures (North American and Grumman) imply
- - ~-zzzx~
comparatively small leverage on the equity through the use
of borrowed funds. On the basis of the sales to net worth
ratio, Boeing and Lockheed among the large firms and
McDonnell among the small firms rank the highest. In terms
of the total assets to net worth ratio, Lockheed and
McDonnell also rank highest. North American and Grumman
rank lowest in terms of both measures.
III. AGGREGATE SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
Aggregate fund flows resulting from the secular
changes in the asset structures noted in the preceeding
paragraphs are summarized in Table 111-4 for the period
1948-59 inclusive. For purposes of comparison, similar data
for all U. S. corporations are also shown. Several interest-
ing factors concerning the financial situation in the air-
craft industry are reflected in these data.
As may be seen, the proportion of total funds derived
from external sources (sale of stocks and bonds) is vir-
tually equal for the aircraft firms and U. S. corporations
as a whole. Of the internal sources, reported earnings of
the aircraft firms are seen to be relatively higher and de-
preciation lower than for all corporations. This difference
results from the fact that the U. S. corporate data includes
depletion allowanc-es which are computed at higher rates than
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depreciation of fixed assets, making this figure somewhat
higher than it would be on a strictly comparable asset
basis. On the other side, the aircraft data do not include
allowances for the depreciation of government facilities,
which are used to a higher degree than in the corporate
universe. Adjustment for these factors would bring these
two figures much closer together.
As to uses of funds, purchase of plant and equipment
by the aircraft firms is less, percentagewise, than for the
corporate universe. This difference is probably attributa-
ble to the relatively high labor content of the product of
the industry and to the substantial use of government facil-
ities. As dividends are about the same percentage of fund
uses in both cases, the remaining difference shows up in a
substantially higher percentage of net working capital for
the aircraft firms than for U. S. corporations. The only
major differences between the large and small firm groups
are in the purchase of capital equipment and net working
capital accounts.
IV. SUMMARY
Three general factors emerge from the aggregate
sales, total asset and net worth comparisons which are ger-
main to the more detailed discussions of fund flows which
TABLE 111-4
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS SUMMARY
4 Large
Companies
4 Smaller
Companies All Aircraft
All U.S.
Corporations
Sources:
Reported Earnings
Depreciation**
Sale of Stock
Sale of Bonds
Total
766.8
288.6
78.8
187.5
58.0
21.8
6.0
14.2
233.2
94.3
18.2
36.1
61.1
24.7
4.7
9.5
1000.0
362.9
97.0
223.6
58.7
22.5
5.7
13.1
243.3
57.6
(4'5
50.1
32.5
(17.4
1321.7 100.0 381.8 100.0 1703.5 100.0 485.4 100.0
Uses:
Cash Dividends
Purchase of Plant
and Equipment
Other
336.7 25.5 91.6 24.0
540.9
39.4
40.9 195.2 51.1
3.0 1.3 0.4
428.3 25.1 121.0 24.9
736.1
40.7
43.2
2.4
282.5
15.4
5d.2
3.2
Total
Increase in NWC
Statistical Discrepancy
GRAND TOTAL
917.0 69.4 288.1 75.5 1205.1 70.7 418.9 86.3
404.7 30.6 93.( 24.5
-- -- a-- --
1321.7 100.0 381.8 100.0
498.4 29.3 58.9
7.6
12.0
1.7
1703.5 100.0 485.4 100.0
* Value in Millions
**Includes other nonf unds expense.
lg
a'
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follow. First, sales growth has not been accompanied by
commensurate growth in assets. Second, in the aggregate, no
substantial differences exist in sales and asset growth pat.-
terns between the groups of large and small firms. Third,
however, marked differences in pattern do emerge at the
individual firm level.
It would appear that the distribution of sources of
funds would be substantially similar for aircraft industry
and the corporate universe if adjustments were made in the
data to compensate for the differences noted concerning
fixed asset investment and depreciation. In terms of the
booksof account for the aircraft firms, however, the dif.-
ferences described above do appear as variations in fund
flow patterns.
The only significant differences in the patterns be-
tween the large and small firm groups with respect to aggre-
gate fund flow are in the purchase of plant and equipment
and, to a slightly lesser degree, in the related deprecia-
tion. In both categories, the proportion of funds involved
is higher for the small firms. Correspondingly, the large
firms show a higher percentage in net working capital than
do the small firms.
Chapter IV
INTERNAL SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
For purposes of this paper, funds are defined as net
working capital, i.e., the difference between current assets
and current liabilities. In the main, this chapter deals
with the principal internal sources of these funds, net
earnings and nonfunds expenses charged to operations (e.g.,
depreciation) together with the major uses of these funds,
namely, dividend payments and fixed asset investment. For
convenience in exposition, however, earnings, dividends and
retained earnings will be discussed together, as will cap-
ital investment and depreciation.
The analysis of these elements of internal fund flows
begins with a consideration of the absolute magnitudes of
aircraft firm earnings, dividends and retained earnings and
the patterns of change in these internal fund sources and
uses during the period 194.8-1959. Coupled with these eval-
uations, analyses are made of the relationships among earn-
ings and sales, total assets and net worth. These ratios
relate the growth patterns outlined in Chapter III to
earnings performance.
Next, dividend payout policy is examined from both a
qualitative and quantitative point of view. Analyses are
made of dividend payout ratios and the manner in which these
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ratios are adjusted to changes in the level of earnings. A
simplified dividend payout model is utilized to derive an
approximation to the rate at which the aircraft firms adjust
dividends to annual variations in earnings.
This model is of the form
AD = a. + b (PEt - Dt-)
where AD is the change in dividends, P is the average payout
ratio for each firm, Et the earnings for the period and Dt-i
the previous dividend. The factor b is the dividend adjust-
ment rate or the fractional adjustment made of the differ-
ence between the dividend which would have been paid at the
current earnings level to maintain the average dividend pay-
out ratio (PEt) and the previous dividend (Dt-1 ).
Following the analysis of earnings, dividends and re-
tained earnings per se, variations in these factors are re-
lated to common stock prices in the secondary securities
market. As a first approximation to the nature of these
relationships, the patterns of change in dividend yield
(i.e., dividends/price) and the price/earnings ratio (i.e.,
price/earnings) are examined. In addition, these relation-
ships are analyzed from a more theoretical point of view,
based upon a model proposed by Gordon and Shapiro.12 In
12
Associate Professor and Professor, respectively, in
the School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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essence, this model postulates that current stock price is a
function of the expected future dividend stream, discounted
at an appropriate rate of interest, or mathematically,
P = Dt
I (l+k)t0
where P is the current price, D the expected future dividend
stream, k the rate of discount and t the time interval. Re-
gression equations were fitted to the price, dividends and
retained earnings data of the aircraft firms, utilizing a
model based upon this conception proposed by Gordon in a
separate article in 1959.13 This model is of the form
P = a0 + bD + b2 (Y-D)
where P is the current stock price, D the current dividend,
Y-D the current retained earnings and bi and b2 the partial
regression coefficients of dividends and retained earnings
respectively.
The analysis in Chapter IV concludes with an evalua-
tion of the remaining two elements of internal fund flows,
namely, capital investment and depreciation. Patterns of
investment are related to the cycle of activity over the
period 1948-1959 in both cumulative and annual terms and the
impact of applicable depreciation and amortization policies
13Myron J. Gordon, "Dividends, Earnings and Stock
Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XLI
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, May 1959)
pp. 99-105.
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are assessed. This section concludes with an analysis of
trends in the ratio of net fixed assets to net worth, fol-
lowed by a summary of major findings in this chapter.
I. NET EARNINGS, DIVIDENDS AND RETAINED EARNINGS
It will be recalled from Chapter III that net earn-
ings account for about 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the
fund sources for all T. S. corporations and the eight air-
craft firms being studied, respectively. Figure IV-1 shows
over-all profits, dividends and retained earnings for the
large and small categories of firms in absolute amounts.
Perhaps the most striking factor evidenced by these data is
the extreme variability in annual net earnings. Both sets
of data reflect marked increases in profits during the early
1950's, leveling off in the mid-1950's and declining there-
after. The decline is much more precipitous for the large
firms, largely reflecting initial losses on commercial
programs.
Similar data are shown for the individual companies
on Figures IV-2 and IV-3. All eight series show the market
upswing in earnings through the early 1950's.- For the large
companies, the general shape of the curves are similar to
the aggregate for the group, peaking in 1954 and declining
thereafter, with two exceptions. Douglas shows a net loss
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of $33.8 million in 1959, attributable to the commercial
program. North American, the only company of those four not
heavily committed to commercial jet programs, does not show
the marked decline in earnings during 1958 and 1959 exper-
ienced by the other companies. In the aggregate, these two
tend to balance out, resulting in an earnings picture for the
group much like that of the individual Boeing and Lockheed
curves.
The pattern among the small companies is much more
erratic. Grumman reflects earnings performance much like
the larger companies. Martin and Northrop show losses in
the late 1940's and early 1950's with substantial recoveries
thereafter. McDonnell, on the other hand, shows a steady
increase in earnings throughout the period.
It will be recalled from Chapter III that aggregate
sales, total assets and net worth increased at a rather
steady rate during this period. These trends, together with
the profit data just discussed result in the familiar ratio
measures of profitability shown on Figure IV-4. These
curves are of the same general shape as those for absolute
profits, but show a different phasing relationship. Until
1954, earnings were increasing faster than asset growth, but
somewhat less than sales. Accordingly, the net earnings/
asset and net worth curves generally rise through the early
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1950's. After that time, profits tended to decline abso-
lutely, while sales, assets and net worth continued to
increase. On the average, the small firms have fared better
than the large companies, as shown in the following table,
although subject to much wider fluctuation due to total net
losses in 1948 and 1951.
TABLE IV-1
RATIOS OF NET EARNINGS TO SALES, TOTAL ASSETS AND NET WORTH
Percentages
Low
Net Earnings/Sales
Large Firms
Small Firms
Net Earnings/Total Assets
Large Firms
Small Firms
Net Earnings/Net Worth
Large Firms
Small Firms
Comparable ratios show aircraft
be less than one-half those for
Moodyt s 125 Industrials series,
3.5
4.8
11.5
13.1
31.8
31.4
.4
-7.5
.9
-12.3
2.6
-22.9
2.4
2.6
6.1
7.1
15.7
17.1
industry earnings/sales to
the corporations in the
although return on net worth
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is about 15 per cent greater.14
The pattern of these data shows a generally increas-
ing level of operations (sales) throughout the period under
study, requiring continually increasing asset support. In
the early part of the period, net earnings were increasing
faster than the required asset growth. During the mid-1950's,
however, profits leveled off, then declined absolutely, re-
sulting in substantial deterioration in earnings ratios. In
combination, these conditions suggest an increasing shortage
of funds beginning in the mid-1950's. It would seem, how-
ever, that the impact of this shortage is relatively greater
upon the large firms than the small.
II. DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICY
As to dividends, the small firms have pursued a some-
what more conservative policy than have the large companies,
averaging a payout of 37.5 and 43.4 per cent, respectively.
In the aggregate, however, both policies are more conserva-
tive than for the corporate universe as a whole, wherein
dividend payout averaged 49.7 per cent during the same time
period. 15
14Moody's Industrial Manual, J.S. Porter, ed.,
"Moody's Common Stock Averages," (New York: D.F. Shea, 1960)
p. a26.
15cf. Table 111-4, Chapter III.
Referring again to Figures IV-1, IV-2 and IV-3, it
will be noted that dividend payments have fluctuated much
less than earnings. Also, dividends tend to increase rela-
tively less than earnings on the upswing of the cycle, al-
though dividends are more responsive to upward movements of
earnings than conversely. It will also be noted that aggre-
gate dividend payment for large firms declined absolutely
beginning in 1956, while small firm dividends continued to
increase.
A qualitative appraisal of the dividend record of the
eight companies being studied provides some general data
which substantiate the above generalizations. The twelve-
year record for the eight companies provides ninety-six
years of earnings and dividend history. In about 55 per
cent of these years, per share earnings increased over the
previous year for both the large and small companies. As a
group, the large companies adjusted dividends upward two-
thirds of the time with an increase in earnings. Dividends
were adjusted downward with a decrease in earnings about
one-third of the time. Over one-fourth of the time, no
change was made in dividends when earnings changed.
The small companies show a much more stable pattern.
Dividends were adjusted upward only one-fourth of the time
with an increase in earnings, and adjusted downward only
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one-sixth of the time with a decrease in earnings. No
change was made in the dividend rate in more than three-
fourths of the years in which earnings changed, however.
Payout ratios, i.e., the percentages of earnings paid
in dividends, have varied widely among the eight firms
studied. Figure IV-5 compares these average ratios for the
period 1948-1959. Within the large firm category the payout
ratio ranges from under 30 per cent to over 60 per cent.
Within the small firm group, the range of variation is even
greater, from about 14 per cent to over 60 per cent.
In an attempt to quantify the dividend policy of the
aircraft firms, least squares regression equations of
historical per share dividend payments16 were fitted to a
simplified version of a payout model suggested by Lintner. 1 7
The equation used was of the form:
AD = a + b (PEt 
- D
where P is the average payout percentage for each firm
(analogous to the desired payout ratio in the Lintner model),
16Palmer 0. Johnson, Statistical Methods in Research
(New York: Frentice-Hall Inc., 1949) pp. 88-91
17John Lintner, "Distribution of Incomes of Corpora-
tions Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes," The
American Economic Review, J.W. Bell and G. Tait, eds.,
Vol. XLVI, No. 2 May 1956 (Menasha, Wisconsin: American
Economic Association), pp. 97-113.
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Et, the earnings for the period, and Dt-l the previous div-
idend. The difference between PEt and Dt 1 is the adjust-
ment which would need to be made to maintain a constant
payout percentage. The term b, or adjustment factor,
reflects that portion of the indicated adjustment which was
actually made, commensurate with the new earnings levels.
The results of this regression analysis are shown in the
following table.
TABLE IV-2
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR DIVIDEND ADJUSTMENT EQUATION 1
Large Firms, Total
Boeing
Douglas
Lockheed
North American
Const ant
A
0
-.02
.04
- .27
.06
.03
Ad justment
Factor
b
.55
.40
.63
.44
.82
Standard
Error of
b
.058
.210
.110
.106
.120
Signif-
icance of
b
.001
.10
.01
.01
.001
Small Firms, Total .03 .20 .048 .001
Grumman .03 .35 .143 .05
Martin .01 .18 .088 .10
McDonnell .03 .53 .228 .05
Northrop .10 .08 .099 .50
Data for this table were computed on the basis of
per share dividend information published in Moody's Handbook
of Widely Held Common Stocks (New York: Moody's Investors
Service, 1960-61).
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The regression coefficient, b, for the groups of large and
small firms was found to be significant at the .001 level
with small standard error. The results for the individual
firms were not so satisfactory, the significance level of b
being .10 or less for three firms. In the case of the two
small firms which have low significance levels, i.e., Martin
and Northrop, both have very low adjustment factors. Martin
did not pay a dividend until 1954 and then only changed it
twice thereafter, suffering heavy losses in 1948 and 1951.
Similarly, Northrop incurred losses in 1949 and 1950, did
not pay a dividend during these years and only made three
adjustments thereafter. In the case of Boeing, the adjust-
ment factor is also due to a reduction in dividends as a
matter of policy to conserve funds during a period of in-
creasing earnings. For the total of the large and small
firms, the significance level is much higher due to averag-
ing effects. The relative adjustment factors correlate rea-
sonably well with intuitive judgments based upon inspection
of the data discussed previously.
The above formulations imply that large firms will
adjust dividend payments with changes in earnings, on the
average, in amounts equal to about one-half of that required
to attain their average payout ratios. Small firms have not
adjusted so rapidly, averaging only about 20 per cent.
r
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These data suggest several general characteristics of
aircraft firm dividend policy. First, the payout ratio
tends to be more conservative than for industry generally,
due in part to the desire to stabilize dividends in the face
of widely fluctuating annual earnings. Further, it is
apparent that the heavy reliance of the industry upon in-
ternal fund sources leads to a desire to conserve these funds
for investment in the enterprise. Second, upward mobility
of dividends in periods of increasing earnings is much
greater than downward movement during periods of declining
earnings. Third, on the average, the adjustment rate of
dividends to changes in earnings would seem to be higher for
the large firms and lower for small firms than the average
found by Lintner in a similar study of a more diverse
industrial group. 9
III. STOCK PRICES, DIVIDENDS AND RETAINED EARNINGS 2 0
It is impossible, of course, to ascertain what might
have happened to sales, earnings and the relative position
of the stockholder, as represented by the market price of
the stock and dividend yield, if more or less conservative
9John Lintner, op.cit., p. 109.
20Data for this section of Chapter IV were computed
on the basis of per share price earnings and dividend inform-
ation published in Moody's Handbook of Widely Held Common
Stocks (New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1960-61).
0
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dividend payout policies had been pursued by individual
firms or by the industry generally. The historical rela-
tionship among stock prices, earnings, dividends and re-
tained earnings is of interest, however, in that the market
price of a share of stock provides an objective measure of
expectations with respect to future income to be derived
from the employment of retained earnings, as compared to the
certainty of a present dividend payment.
Average yearly stock prices for the eight aircraft
companies are shown on Figures IV-6 and IV-7. All rates of
price growth from 1948-50 to 1957-59, except one, have been
greater than for Moody's 125 Industrials shown in the lower
right hand corner. In general, this more substantial rate
of growth is most pronounced in the years 1953-1956, most
curves showing some decline after that period. The follow-
ing table gives some indication of these growth rates.
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TABLE IV-3
AVERAGE STOCK PRICES
1948-50
Moody's 125 Industrials
Large Companies
Boeing
Douglas
Lockheed
North American
Small Companies
Grumman
Martin
McDonnell
50.74
4.38
11.18
5.90
5.85
14.17
13.59
2.77
4.95
1957-59
159.91
42.98
61.44
26.55
35.49
24.19
59.10
16.84
Increase
3.2
9.8
6.1
1.7
6.1
28.86 5.8Northrop
The relationship between stock price movements and
earnings is usually expressed in terms of a price/earnings
ratio. Figures IV-8 and IV-9 show the price/earnings ratios
for the eight aircraft companies. Again, comparable data
for Moody's 125 Industrials have been included on the lower
right charts for comparative purposes.
In general, the trend has been for the P/E ratio to
rise throughout this period, although with the exception of
1959, the aircraft ratios have been less than the Moody's
Industrials, indicating a greater relative discount of
future earnings potentials than for the industrials gener-
ally. All curves tend to reach minimums around 1953, the
year in which stock prices began their marked rate of
increase. Earnings, on the other hand, tended to reach sub-
stantial rates of growth one or two years earlier. Accord-
ingly, some downward movement occurred prior to 1953, at
which time prices increased faster than earnings, resulting
in a higher price/earnings ratio.
The 1948-1959 average price/earnings ratios are re-
markably comparable for the large companies, ranging from a
low of 7.6 for North American to 8.7 for Boeing, with
Douglas and Lockheed falling almost exactly in between.
Considerable variation is seen among the smaller companies,
however. Ratios range from a low of 4.6 for McDonnell to
-U
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9.4 for Grumman, with Martin and Northrop averaging 6.6 and
5.9, respectively.
Another commonly used relationship involving stock
prices is the dividend yield, i.e., dividends divided by
price. These relationships for the eight companies being
studied are shown on Figures IV-10 and IV-il. The average
yield for the large companies as a group is 6.5 per cent,
and 4.4 per cent for the group of small companies. These
percentage yields compare with an average yield on Moody's
125 Industrials of 5.0 per cent for the same time period.
Although differing in average yield, the large firms
series move in the same cyclical phasing. Peak yields occur
in the periods 1949, 1953 and 1957, with low points in 1948,
1951 and 1956. As a group, the small companies follow a
much more erratic pattern. Generally, however, dividend
yields have moved downward throughout the period being
studied. In the aggregate, this downward movement has been
at a greater rate than that for Moody's 125 Industrials.
Thus far, trends in total earnings and dividends,
together with various ratio analyses relating these factors
to returns on sales, assets, net worth and market price have
been considered in this chapter. In general, a pattern re-
flecting a high degree of variability has been evidenced by
these data. Most measures reflecting current profitability
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have peaked in the middle 1950's, beginning from low points
in the late 1940's and declining during most recent years.
It now seems appropriate to attempt to link the investment
markets' appraisal of this performance as reflected in stock
market price with a combination of the elements of earnings,
dividends, retained earnings and return on investment.
There are probably as many theories about what deter-
mines the market price of a share of stock as there are in-
vestors. However, it is generally accepted that, in a
rational market, the current price of a share of stock re-
flects the present value of a stream of expected future
earnings discounted at some appropriate rate of interest.
Mathematically, this relationship is normally expressed in
the familiar annuity formulae of the form:
P = D
r (l+k)L
00.-
where P is the current price, D the expected future div-
idends, k the rate of discount and t the time interval.
Gordon and Shapiro have shown that the rate of dis-
count k can be expressed as follows:
k = DO + br
Po
where k is the earnings return on a share of common stock,
Do the current dividend yield, b the portion of current
O
-U
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income retained in the business and r the expected rate of
return on stockholders' investment.21 Under the assumption
that r is equal to the current rate of return, the formulae
for k become:
k = + (Y-D) Y D + Y-D
P Y B P B
where Y is the current net earnings and B the book value of
the owners' equity or net worth. It can be shown by trans-
formation that
P D
k-t-0
B
based upon the assumption previously outlined.
In a separate article, Gordon explores the relation-
ship among stock price, dividends and retained earnings from
three points of view, namely that stock price is a function
of (1) both dividends and earnings, (2) the dividends and (3)
the earnings.22 The model hypothesized for the first assump-
tion is of the form
P = a0 + b, D + b 2Y
where P is stock price, D the year's dividend and Y the
year's income.
2 1 Myron J. Gordon and Eli Shapiro, "Capital Equipment
Analysis: The Required Rate of Profit," Management Science,
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 102-110.
22Myron J. Gordon, loc.cit.
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As to the second hypothesis, the model of the form
P = a0 + b D + b2 (YD)
is postulated. This model is based upon the Gordon and
Shapiro model referred to above. The reasoning underlying
this formulation is that the most important and predictable
cause of growth in a corporation's earnings is retained
earnings, i.e., if a corporation is expected to earn a
return on investment r, and retain a portion of its income
for this purpose, the corporation's dividends can be ex-
pected to grow at the rate of br, or
br = (Y-D) (Y) - D(Y ) (B) - B
as shown previously. It is further argued that investors
are interested in absolute growth, not rate of growth.
Therefore, the retained earnings without deflation by book
value would be expected to bear a closer relationship to the
absolute values of price and dividends.
Gordon fit multiple regression equations to data for
a number of companies in four industries, for two separate
years (1951 and 1954), using the above two formulations.
The latter model seemed superior in several respects,
although multiple correlation coefficients were the same for
both. These tended to average in the order of .90. In gen-
eral, the partial regression coefficients for dividends were
higher than for retained earnings by several orders of mag-
nitude, depending on the industry. With respect to this re-
lationship, it is noted that since the retained earnings
coefficient represents the price the market is willing to
pay for growth, the only theoretical requirement is that it
be positive. As related to the dividend coefficient, however,
it is noted that growth is very uncertain and that it be-
cones quantitatively important only in the distant future.
A third, and theoretically more satisfactory but more
complex regression equation, based upon adjustments in scale
among firms and utilizing concepts of past average earnings
and dividends was also presented by Gordon.23 However, due
to the small sample size of the aircraft firms (Gordon used
thirty-two and fifty-two firms in each industry) investiga-
tion of this approach was not considered feasible for this
study.
As an alternative to the latter more complex analysis,
regression analyses of the form
P 9 ao + b1 D + b 2 (Y-D)
23Ibid., p. 104.
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were made of the eight firms being studied on a time series
basis for the period 1948-1959. This approach yields twelve
years of history for each company, and forty-eight years of
history each for the groups of large and small firms. As in
all time series correlation analyses, however, the problems
associated with the degree of data independence and possible
spurious correlation between variables are present. The
degree to which these two possible difficulties influence
the results of the following analyses cannot be determined
in any quantifiable way. As noted in the following analysis
of the unadjusted price data, some degree of autocorrelation
is suspected, due to the general rise in stock market prices.
With respect to the data being considered here, it is
asserted that the relationship between stock price and div-
idends and retained earnings is not a casual one and that,
to a high degree, the final results of these analyses after
the adjustment made for the general market price increase,
are indicative of real relationships. The reader is cau-
tioned, however, that the possibility of spurious correla-
tion remains. With the foregoing caution in mind, the
results of the analysis, based upon unadjusted price data,
are summarized in the following table.
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TABLE IV-4
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AND REGRESSION EQUATIONS
FOR PRICE AND DIVIDENDS AND RETAINED EARNINGS
R Pc a b b B B
o 1 2 1 2
Large Firms, Total .85 .01 2.14 18.42 -. 28 .84 -. 03
Boeing .76 .05 -1.18 18.19 4.20 .45 .35
Douglas .92 .01 8.55 23.76 -3.35 1.16 -.47
Lockheed .93 .01 .07 24.72 -4.95 1.01 -.35
North American .91 .01 -3.65 16.68 3.46 .73 .18
Small Firms, Total .82 .01 7.71 12.24 -.10 .80 .04
Grumman .87 .01 -1.47 13.83 1.20 .99 .07
Martin .95 .01 13.16 15.77 -.17 .98 -.11
McDonnell .88 .01 -1.06 20.47 2.89 .45 .19
Northrop .95 .01 2.84 15.83 .09 .93 ..02
Moody's 125 Industrials .95 .01 109.3 41.22 5.53 .91 .10
where R is the multiple correlation coefficient between price, div-
idends and retained earnings; P is the F test significance level of
R; a the constant in the regression equation; b, the dividend partial
regression coefficient. B and B2 are the standard partial regression
coefficients relating to bI and b 2 respectively, which give measures
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of the comparative weight attributable to each of the independent
variables, independent of their initial units of measure.
In general, the correlation coefficients are reasonably high
and, with the exception of Boeing, are significant at the .01 level.
For the total history of the large firms, about .72 of the variance in
market price of stock is explained in terms of variations in dividends
and retained earnings. For the small firms, the explained variance is
approximately .67.
Turning to the partial regression coefficients, the b's and
B's, it will be noted that a number of negative values appear in the
B2 column. This result is not consistent with the theoretical consid-
eration upon which the model is based. These negative values imply
that, for these firms, all earnings retentions have the effect of
reducing market price.
A possible explanation of these negative values lies in the
general rise in the market price of stock during the period studied.
Throughout most of this period, the price/earnings ratio for Moody's
125 Industrials was increasing. Accordingly, the calculated regres-
sion coefficients shown above reflect not only these specific rela-
tionships, but must also account for the general increase in market
price. Considering the distribution of the dependence of price as
between dividends and retained earnings, it would seem likely that
the dependence on dividends would be overstated and dependence on
retained earnings would be understated.
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As a test of this hypothesis, the per share stock prices of the
aircraft firms were deflated by a price index derived from the Moody's
125 Industrials series. This, in effect, makes the price variation in
aircraft stocks independent of the status of the market generally, and
more directly related to the distribution of earnings between divid-
ends and retained earnings within the aircraft firms. The results of
these latter analyses are shown in the following table.
73
TABLE IV-5
ADJUSTED CORREIATION AND REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
R P< b b2 B1 B2
Large Firms, Total .93 .01 5.69 .02 .92 .05
Boeing .90 .01 3.26 1.86 .71 1.07
Douglas .97 .01 5.46 -.15 1.03 -.08
Lockheed .89 .01 3.20 .29 2.25 .29
North American .93 .01 3.92 .48 1.69 .24
Small Firms, Total .70 .01 3.94 -.27 .49 -.12
Grumman .53 n.s. 2.87 1.07 .41 .12
Martin .55 n.s. .27 .09 .10 -.09
McDonnell .90 .01 3.38 .55 .25 .29
Northrop .84 .01 2.81 .17 .42 .06
Moody's 125 Industrials .95 .01 41.22 5.53 .91 .10
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It will be seen that the coefficient of correlation, R, is
somewhat improved for the large firms. Correlation coefficients for
the small firms are generally lower, however, and two are not significant
at the .05 level. The negative values of B2 have been eliminated in
all but two individual company cases, and in the case of Douglas, have
been reduced substantially in significance. On the basis of the adjus-
ted price relationships, both Grumman and Martin reflect lower stock
prices in 1959 than in 1948. It would appear, therefore, that the
higher correlations for these firms in the previous data were not
attributable to dividend and retained earnings effects, but to other
factors, among which was the general market price rise during the
period. The negative regression coefficient for the small firms total
is due to the heavy Martin losses in the early 1950's.
On the basis of the latter analysis, it would appear that a
part of the heavy dependence of market price upon dividends was in-
fluenced by the general rise in the market, particularly with respect
to the smaller firms. Comparisons of the B 's between the large and
small firms on the basis of adjusted price regressions seems to more
nearly reflect the lower dividend payout ratios and slower rate of
adjustment discussed earlier for the small firms. Further, the ratios
of the B 's to the B 2's are more nearly compatible with the differ-
ences in these factors between the groups of large and small firms.
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IV. INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS AND DEPRECIATION
It is appropriate at this point to turn to a consideration of
two other major elements of internal fund flow, namely, investment in
fixed assets and depreciation. During the period 1949-59, these two
elements have accounted for 43.2 per cent and 22.5 per cent of funds
uses and sources, respectively, for the eight firms being studied.
For the large firms as a group, fixed asset investment has accounted
for 40.9 per cent of fund uses, depreciation amounting to 21.8 per
cent of fund sources. These percentages are higher for the small firms
as a group, totaling 51.1 per cent and 24.7 per cent for fixed asset
investment and depreciation. The cumulative buildup of these two fund
flows for the two groups of companies is depicted in Figures IV-12 and
IV-13.
The patterns shown for the four large companies is one of a
generally accelerating rate of expenditure for fixed assets throughout
the period, matched by a less rapid acceleration in cumulative depre-
ciation. In 1948, 56.4 per cent of the gross investment in fixed
assets had been depreciated, while in 1959, 48.5 per cent had been
depreciated by the four large firms. For the large firm group as a
whole, net fixed assets had increased from slightly over $38 million
to over $288.6 million. As a percentage of net worth, these amounts
represent an increase from 18.6 per cent in 1948 to 41.3 per cent in
1959 for the large firms. Fund recovery from investment in fixed
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assets. i.e., the horizontal calendar distance between cumulative
gross investment and cumulative depreciation, ranges from one and one-
half years for Boeing to two and one-half years for Douglas, at
expenditure rates experienced during the latter 1950's.
In terms of general trends, the experience of the small firms
shown on Figure IV-13 is quite similar to that of the large firms,
although percentage relationships for the groups differ, largely due
to the influence of the Martin data. In 1948, small firms had depre-
ciated 35.9 per cent of gross fixed assets, while by 1959, this per-
centage had risen to 40.7 per cent. Net fixed asset investments total
a substantially higher percentage of net worth for the small firms
than for the large, being 42.5 and 54.0 per cent for 1948 and 1959,
respectively. The rate of fund recovery averages slightly over one
and one-half years at 1959 expenditure levels.
The foregoing data are highly suspect, however, for purposes of
making comparisons among firms as to level of total assets employed, due
principally to the differences in accounting practices concerning
fully depreciated facilities. Boeing, for example, carries the total
cost and depreciation of fully depreciated facilities in the balance
sheet accounts as long as the facilities are being utilized. Douglas,
on the other hand, eliminates the data for fully depreciated facil-
ities from the accounts, even though the facilities are still being
operated. Although it could not be confirmed from corporate reports,
__ l
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recent information published in connection with securities issues
would indicate that Lockheed and North American follow the Boeing
practice of maintaining the acquisition cost and depreciation data in
the accounts as long as the facilities are being utilized. It is
estimated from the data available that reductions in both the gross
assets and depreciation accounts of approximately $22 million, $21
million and $8 million in 1959 for Boeing, Lockheed and North American,
respectively, would make them roughly comparable in total magnitude
with the Douglas data. These adjustments are indicated on the charted
information. Correspondingly, the per cent of total assets depre-
ciated would be somewhat higher than indicated if allowance were made
in the Douglas data for fully depreciated facilities being utilized
but not carried on the balance sheet.
Of the small firms, available information indicated that only
Martin followed the Douglas practice. In the absence of information
to the contrary, however, it would seem likely that values for fully
depreciated facilities are retained in the accounts by the other firms
until sold or retired.
Other differences in accounting practice regarding depreciation
exist among the eight firms studied, but for the most part these
differences would not seem to result in significant discrepancies in
comparative data for the purpose used here. For the most part, the
aircraft firms have used some form of accelerated depreciation, either
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sum-of-the-year's-digit or declining balance, for both tax and
operational reporting since the 1954 recession in the tax law. Prior
to that time, depreciation was universally computed on a straight line
basis.
Another important aspect of depreciation accounting within the
aircraft industry was the provision of the tax law which permitted
writing off the certified portion of emergency facilities at an
accelerated rate over a sixty month period, the balance usually being
depreciated on a straight line basis. Reporting on the extent of
accelerated amortization has been limited. Illustrative of the
significance of this provision in terms of fund flows, however, is the
case of Boeing, for which reporting of accelerated amortization is
segregated.
Certificates of necessity were received on facilities costing
$77.6 million from 1949-59, $49.7 million of which was certified for
write-off within the sixty month period. The $77.6 million amounted to
slightly over 40 per cent of total fixed asset additions during this
period. Amortization in excess of normal depreciation amounted to
$4.3 million in the year 1959 alone, or 22.5 per cent of the total
depreciation charged. Comparably, Douglas and North America had
received certification for accelerated amortization covering facil-
ities costing $38.2 million and $8.0 million, respectively, since 1949.
The annual accelerated amortization data are not segregated for these
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firms. Information separating accelerated amortization from normal
depreciation is not given for the other firms being studied.
The tax law providing for this type of accelerated amortization
expired in 1959. It is apparent that fund flows resulting from depre-
ciation of fixed asset investments will be substantially reduced on
facilities purchased after that date.
Normally, the full amount of the accelerated amortization
allowed for tax purposes has not been allowed as overhead cost for
government contract pricing purposes. While most firms have reported
the accelerated amortization for both tax and operational accounting,
at least McDonnell has used the lesser contract pricing allowance for
purposes of operational reporting. As a result, the reported net
earnings for McDonnell would be overstated as compared to the other
firms.
Annual gross addition to fixed assets and depreciation are
shown on Figures IV-14 and IV-15. It will be noted that most curves
show sharp relative increases during the latter 1950's. For the large
firms, expenditures have increased from levels averaging less than
$2.0 million annually to levels in the order of $20 million in 1959.
Expenditure levels for small firms have increased in about the same
relative order of magnitude, about ten times 1948 levels. For the
most part, annual expenditures have exceeded annual depreciation
charges by a considerable amount.
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The patterns of expenditures for fixed assets and depreciation
flows are significant with respect to the 1948 net worth position and
subsequent net earnings patterns discussed earlier. For all of the
large firms except North American, earnings declined sharply in the
latter 1950's. Smaller firms except McDonnell experienced the same
trend, although to a lesser degree. The combined effect of these two
patterns is shown on Figures IV-16 and IV-17.
For the large companies, the trends are generally upward,
although at different rates and from different base points. The ratio
of net fixed assets/net worth has increased from about 10 per cent to
35 per cent for both Boeing and North American. The percentage for
Douglas and Lockheed has increased to about 50 per cent, beginning
from substantially higher levels in 1948.
The patterns for small firms are much less consistent as to
trend. Grumman maintained a fairly constant percentage of approxim-
ately 20 per cent until heavy expenditures combined with decreased
earnings raised this figure to about 45 per cent in 1959. The down-
ward trend of Martin reflects an improving earnings picture with
respect to fixed asset expenditures following heavy losses in the
early part of the period. McDonnell facilities expenditures peaked
sharply in 1952 at a fairly low net worth level which showed steady
improvement based upon continually increased earnings thereafter. The
Northrop pattern is erratic on an annual basis, but tends toward a
long term level of about 35 per cent.
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V. SUMMARY
The principal elements of internal sources and uses of funds
have been examined in the several previous sections of this chapter.
The purpose of this section is to summarize the over-all findings of
these analyses.
Aggregate earnings showed great variation during the period
studied. For the large firms, earnings were nearly level from 1948-
1951, averaging about $25 million per year. Beginning in 1952, how-
ever, annual earnings increased sharply to about $120 million and
remained at a high level until a sharp decline was experienced in 1958
and 1959, reflecting large initial losses on commercial programs. The
small firm pattern was similar, remaining at a very low level during
the early 1950's and increasing sharply to high levels through the
middle 1950's. On the whole, however, the decline in earnings was not
as severe for the small firms as for the large. Total net earnings as
a percentage of sales averaged about 2.5 per cent during the period
studied, about one-half the rate for industrial corporations generally.
Ratios of earnings to net worth, averaging about 16 per cent for the
aircraft firms, were approximately 2.5 per cent higher than for Moody's
125 Industrials over the same 'time period.
On the whole, the dividend payout policies of the aircraft
firms have been somewhat more conservative than for U. S. corporations
generally. Dividend payout ratios have averaged about 40 per cent for
the aircraft firms as compared to 50 per cent for all U.S. corporations.
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Substantial differences in payout policy were found among the aircraft
firms, ranging from 30 per cent to 60 per cent among the large firms,
and from 14 per cent to over 60 per cent among the small firms.
Rates of adjustment in dividend payments to changes in levels
of earnings were found to be about 50 per cent and 20 per cent for the
groups of large and small firms respectively. These percentages apply
to the difference between the dividend which would have been paid at
the average payout ratio for each firm and the previous dividend.
The rate of adjustment for the large firms was somewhat higher than
that found for other, more diverse, industrial groups which have been
studied by others. The rate for the smaller firms was lower.
The analysis of the trends in the stock prices, dividends and
retained earnings indicated that prices for the stocks of aircraft
firms have moved upward at a higher rate than for the average of
Moody's 125 Industrials throughout the period studied. In combination
with trends in dividends, this price movement resulted in a downward
trend in dividend yield throughout the period, the aircraft firms at a
faster rate than the industrials as a whole. The average yield was
somewhat higher for the aircraft firms than for the industrials, how-
ever. Price/earnings ratios tended to move upward for both the air-
craft and industrials series throughout the period, the industrials at
a faster rate than the aircraft ratios.
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Regression analyses of the relationships among stock price,
dividends and retained earnings showed a strong dependence of price
upon current dividends, particularly for the large firms. Without
adjustment in price to compensate for the general rise in the market
during this period, the ratio between the standard partial regression
coefficient for dividends and for retained earnings was approximately
20 to 1, about double the ratio found in analyses made by others of a
broader range of industrial groups. When the price of aircraft stocks
was deflated by an index reflecting the general rise in the price of
industrial stocks, the ratio of this dependence remained about the
same for the large firms, but declined substantially for the small
firms, showing significant correlations on this basis. On the whole,
the results of these analyses suggest a strong preference by the mar-
ket for the certainty of present dividends from the aircraft firms
and a rather high discount of earnings potentials resulting from the
employment of retained earnings.
Turning to the other two major elements of internal sources and
uses of funds, it was noted that fixed asset investment accounted for
approximately 43.2 per cent and 22.5 per cent of total funds uses and
sources, respectively. Small firms invested a somewhat higher percent-
age of total fund sources in fixed assets (51.1 per cent) than did the
large firms (40.9 per cent).
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For most of the period, gross additions to plant and equipment
were substantially above the returning fund flow from depreciation.
At expenditure rates experienced during the latter 1950's, the time
lag between cumulative gross investment and cumulative depreciation
averaged about two years. On an annual basis, investments in fixed
assets showed marked increases during the latter 1950's.
Accounting practices with respect to fixed assets were found to
vary somewhat among firms. Generally, however, the values of fully
depreciated facilities are kept on the books as long as the assets are
being utilized and the same depreciation figures are reported for both
operational and tax purposes.
Available data indicated that the provision for accelerated
amortization, permitting the write-off of the certified portion of
emergency facilities over a sixty-month period, had been an important
factor in depreciation fund flows since 1950. For the one large
company for which data was available segregating these allowances, the
certified portion of total facility investments during this period
amounted to approximately 40 per cent. In 1959 alone, the amortiza-
tion charged in excess of normal depreciation amounted to 22.5 per
cent of the total depreciation charged. As this law expired in 1959,
depreciation and amortization fund flows can be expected to be sharply
reduced as a percentage of total fund sources in the future.
On an over-all basis, trends noted above with respect to fixed
asset investments and depreciation resulted in a substantial increase
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in net fixed asset investment during the period studied. Generally,
this pattern, in combination with the earnings and dividends trends
noted heretofore, resulted in substantial increases in the percentage
of net worth represented by net fixed assets, particularly after the
mid 1950's. As a result, the percentage of internally generated funds
which were available for addition to net working capital, required to
support a continually rising sales level, were sharply reduced. The
impact of this trend upon the financial structure of the aircraft
firms is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter V
NET WORKING CAPITAL AND EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FUNDS
The previous chapter dealt with the major elements of internal
fund flows, namely, earnings, dividends, retained earnings, fixed
asset investment and depreciation as reflected in the accounts of the
eight aircraft firms being studied. The purpose of this chapter is to
determine the net effect of these internal fund flows upon the total
requirement for funds, i.e., net working capital, to evaluate the
extent and timing of the recourse by the aircraft firms to external
fund sources, and to appraise the institutional and risk character-
istics associated with the resulting long term debt issues.
With respect to funds requirements, this evaluation will focus
upon the patterns exhibited by the ratios of current assets to sales
and current assets to current liabilities as relative indices of total
operational demand for funds. Following these analyses, the distribu-
tion of total funds supplies as between internal and external sources,
will be summarized in order to establish the general magnitude and
time phasing of the demand for externally supplied funds. This evalu-
ation is supplemented by a description of the institutional nature of
the arrangements under which externally supplied funds were obtained.
Finally, the relative leverage and risk position of the several firms
which incurred long term debt through the issue of debentures will be
assessed in approximate terms. This analysis is accomplished by eval-
uating the ranges of earnings over which a bond issue would be
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expected to result in earnings per share greater than, equal to, or
less than a stock issue of comparable dollar amount.
I. NET WORKING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Two conumonly used indices of the total requirements for funds
are the ratios of current assets to total sales and current assets to
current liabilities. Operational requirements relating to the turn-
over of current asset and current liability accounts with respect to
income, generally determine minimums for the former. Managerial and
financial conceptions regarding required margins of liquidity gener-
ally determine desirable levels for the latter. In combination, these
two factors are the major determinants of the requirement for funds.
The patterns of the ratio of current assets to sales are quite
diverse, although certain common general tendencies are seen to exist.
Figures V-1 and V-2 show these patterns for the groups of large and
small firms, respectively. On the whole, the trend in the ratio is
downward throughout the period, although three of the large and one of
the small firms show an increase following a low point in 1953-54.
The average ratio during the latter 1950's is about 25 to 30 per cent,
indicating a turnover rate of current assets of between 3.3 and 4.0
with respect to sales. The ability of the aircraft firms to achieve
these low ratios on a relatively long cycle product was dependent, in
large part, upon the high percentage of progress payments (70 to 90
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per cent) made on military work in process. Differences in product
mix, which result in higher percentages of commercial with respect to
military work, would place relatively higher inventory burdens upon
the aircraft firms.
Figures V-3 and V-4 show the related ratios of current assets
to current liabilities. For the large firms, the patterns show sharp
declines during the early part of the period studied, and tend to rise
again at some point during the middle 1950's as additional funds were
made available, either from internal operations or from external
sources. During this period, increasing use was made of short term
debt to finance current operations. From 1948 to 1959, short term
debt increased from a negligible amount to about $295 million for the
eight firms, representing about 23 per cent of total current
liabilities. These data, together with the timing of long term debt
issues would indicate that the large firms believe that a current
ratio of 1.25 is marginally low, but that a ratio of 1.50 to 1.75 is
adequate, considering the nature of the current assets and liabilities
involved. The small firms exhibit a much less uniform pattern, but
have tended to operate in a manner consistent with ratios noted above.
II. TOTAL NET WORKING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Although it is impossible to trace the flow of a single dollar
from source to expenditure within a firm, it is helpful in the present
context to think of changes in net working capital during the period
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1948-1959 as consisting of three elements, namely, the net additions
from the internal fund flows discussed in Chapter IV, the net addi-
tions from long term debt and the new funds derived from sales of
stock since 1948.
Figure V-5 depicts the cumulative growth in net working capital
for the groups of large and small firms. From 1948-1959 net working
capital for the group of large firms increased approximately $404.7
million, or about 3.5 times the January, 1948 level. Of this
total, $138.4 million, or 34.2 per cent, was derived from internal
operations and $266.3 million, or 65.8 per cent from external sources.
Of the external sources, $78.8 million, or 19.5 per cent of the total
increase represented sales of stock in some form and $187.5 million,
or 46.3 per cent, were net increases in long term debt.
As to pattern of increase, no appreciable change in net working
capital was experienced until a sharp upward trend began in 1953,
lasting until 1958. During this interval, the average annual increase
was $64.5 million, or 36.5 per cent per year. Virtually all of the
increase in net working capital was derived from internal operations
until 1955, from which time external sources supplied an increasing
proportion of total requirements. It will be seen that from 1954-1959,
cumulative net additions from internal sources remained substantially
level.
The general pattern of increase is similar for the small firms,
with no appreciable change in net working capital occurring from
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1948-1951, but increasing rapidly thereafter. The total increase over
the period was $93.7 million, or about 3.0 times the January 1948
levels. Net contributions from internal operations accounted for
$39.3 million, or 42 per cent of the total increase, $18.2 million,
or 19.4 per cent, deriving from the sale of stock and $36.2 million,
or 38.6 per cent from net increases in long term debt. From 1951 to
1959, the average annual increase was $12.7 million, or about 32 per
cent per year. In total, the amount of working capital derived from
internal operations did not change materially from 1954 to 1959, the
increases in 1955 and 1958-1959 being offset by the sharp declines in
1956 and 1957.
Comparing these two classes of firms, it will be noted that the
large firms derived less of the total increase in net working capital
from internal operations than did the small firms (34.2 per cent and
42.0 per cent, respectively). As to external sources, the ratio of
long term debt to sale of stock was 2.4-1 for the large firms and
2.0-1 for the small firms.
In general, then, the small firms have relied upon internal
sources of funds and sale of stock to a greater degree than have the
large firms. Correspondingly, the large firms have relied upon a
greater relative amount of external funds and have incurred a greater
proportion of long term debt than have the small firms. Most signifi-
cant, perhaps, is the fact that in both groups the level of over-all net
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working capital supplied from internal operations did not change mat-
erially from 1954-1959, resulting in the total increase being supplied
by external funds.
Figure V-6 depicts the same data in terms of annual changes in
net working capital. Except for 1951 and 1959, the large firms have
added to net working capital in each year during the period studied.
The sharpest rise in annual additions occurs from 1951 to 1954 and
from 1957 to 1958. Over all, the rate of additions declined substan-
tially from 1954 to 1957. The small firms exhibit a much more erratic
pattern than do the large firms, showing decreases in four years dur-
ing the period.
The cumulative and annual data for the individual companies
shown on Figures V-7, V-8, V-9 and V-10 are included for reference.
The patterns are substantially similar to the group totals. Working
capital generally remains level or rises moderately during the late
1940's and early 1950's, rises sharply through the middle 1950's,
utilizing essentially internally supplied funds, and continues to
increase thereafter in total, but with heavy reliance on external fund
supplies. Correspondingly, the annual additions to net working cap-
ital are generally nominal through the early 1950's, increase in rate
through the middle 1950's, and decline again, with perhaps another
substantial peak in the late 1950's.
Taken together, these data generally indicate that for both
classes of firms, the total level of operations was maintained through
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the early 1950's with substantially the same level of working capital
as existed at the outset of the period. Following that time, substan-
tial increases in working capital were required. The conditions re-
garding supply of funds are divided into three distinct phases. From
1948-1952, the total supply of funds from internal sources remained
virtually level, as did total requirements. From then until the mid-
dle 1950's, increasing requirements were met almost wholly from in-
ternal sources. From the middle 1950's until 1959, however, total
internal funds supplies again remained virtually level, resulting in
heavy reliance on external fund sources as total requirements contin-
ued to increase substantially.
III. EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FUNDS
The foregoing section of this chapter has been concerned with
the total requirements for net working capital and the patterns of net
contribution to this account, as between internal and external sources
of funds. As noted, external supplies of funds made negligible
contributions to increases in net working capital among the large
firms until 1955. For the group of small firms, two periods of re-
course to long term fund sources were noted, in 1951 and 1952, and
from 1955-1959. It is appropriate at this point to examine the
institutional nature of these fund supplies.
With respect to the group of eight aircraft firms as a whole,
the predominant external source of funds has been through the sale of
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debentures, both in terms of dollar amount and frequency of occurrence.
Since 1947, sale of bonds by the large firms has totalled approximately
$217 million, as compared to approximately $79 million of funds
secured through the sale of stock. An analysis of the stock trans-
actions of the large firms, which were classified as stock for pur-
poses of this study24 indicates, however, that only the North American
issue of September, 1956, totalling slightly over $42 million,
involved a public offering in the traditional sense. The balance of
about $27 million were funds derived from sales associated with stock
options, employee incentive and benefit plans, issues of stock in
connection with acquisitions, and conversions of debentures having
these rights. On the other hand, the large firms have floated six new
bond issues since 1947. Similarly, of the small firms, only the
Northrop stock issue which netted the company $1.6 million in 1951 was
offered to the public, the balance shown as sales being items of the
nature noted above for the large firms.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LONG TERM DEBT
In frequency of use, long term bond issues have been almost
equally split as between straight debentures and convertible subordin-
ated debentures. The following table lists the principal institutional
characteristics of these issues, all of which include sinking fund
provisions 25
24Cf. Appendix E.
2 5Moody's Industrial Manual, J.S. Porter, ed., (New York:
D.F. Shea, 1960).
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TABLE V-1
AIRCRAFT FIRM DEBENTURE ISSUES
Date of Issue
8/1/58
6/1/58
2/1/57
4/1/58
5/1/55
5/1/56
11/1/58
12/1/55
7/1/59
Term
20 years
22 years
20 years
20 years
25 years
20 years
10 years
20 years
20 years
Amount Authorized
$40,000,000
30,597,600
27,900,000
60,000,000
30,000,000
30,000,000
20,000,000
10,000,000
10,000,000
Sr. Deb.
C.S.D.
C.S.D.
Sr. Deb.
C.S.D.
Sr. Deb.
Sr. Deb/WW
C.S.D.
C.S.D.
In all cases, the large firms have used these
issues in combination, the convertible subordinated
first, with the senior debenture issue being equal t
two types of
issue being placed
o or larger in
amount than the subordinated issue. With one exception, the term of
the issue is twenty years or more. The senior debentures have been
RatingFirm
Boeing
Boeing
Douglas
Douglas
Lockheed
Lockheed
Martin
Northrop
Northrop
Baa
Ba
Ba
Baa
Ba
Baa
Baa
Ba
Ba
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rated Baa by Moody's, a classification defined as "lower medium grade
obligations...neither highly protected nor poorly secured...(having)
speculative characteristics."26 The convertible subordinated debent-
ures are rated one level lower, based upon an assessment of a greater
speculative element and uncertainty of position.27 Among the large
firms, only North American has no long term debt.
Among the small firms, only two have issued long term debent-
ures. The single Martin issue in 1958 was for a term of ten years,
with other characteristics as described above. Northrop placed two
issues, both of which were convertible, one each in 1955 and 1959.
All of the issues discussed in the foregoing paragraphs were initially
publicly placed except for the Boeing subordinated convertible debent-
ures and the North American stock issue which were offered to their
stockholders on a pro-rata subscription basis. In both cases, sub-
stantial portions of the issues were subscribed prior to public offerings.
Both of the other two small firms have incurred long term debt during
this period, Grumman having secured a term loan in 1959 and McDonell
a mortgage and a term loan in 1951 and 1957, respectively.
None of the senior or subordinated debenture issues listed
above has been retired through the sinking fund provisions prior to
1960. Mandatory sinking fund payments are not scheduled to begin on
the senior debentures until five to six years after the date of issue,
2 6Ibid., p. iv.
27 Ibid.
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except for the shorter term Martin debenture on which sinking fund
payments were scheduled to begin two years after issue. Sinking fund
payments on the subordinated convertible issues are not scheduled to
begin until ten years after the date of issue, with the exception of
Northrop, wherein the term is specified as five years. This means
that each of the above firms will face initial mandatory sinking fund
payments on the dates and in the amounts shown in the table below, and
at a later date during 1960, depending on the issue, will need to make
total sinking fund payments as indicated. Of the two subordinated
debenture issues, only those issued by Lockheed and Martin in 1955
have been redeemed in significant amounts through conversion to common
stock. By the end of 1959, approximately 60 per cent of the Lockheed
issue and about 52 per cent of the Northrop issue had been converted.
TABLE V-2
DEBENTURE SINKING FUND PAYMENTS
Date of Initial Date of Sinking Fund
Sinking Fund Payments Amount Payment on Second Issue Total*
Boeing 8/1/64 $2,700,000 1/1/68 $4,450,000
Douglas 4/1/63 3,750,000 2/1/67 5,850,000
Lockheed 11/1/61 1,875,000 5/1/65 2,465,000
Martin 11/1/60 2,250,000 n.a. n.a.
Northrop 12/1/60 241,900 5/1/64 741,900
*Based upon amounts outstanding on the close of the firm's
fiscal year.
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The comparatively low ratings received on bonds issued by the
aircraft firms (Baa on senior debentures and Ba on subordinated con-
vertible debentures) are indicative of the relatively high expense of
this form of financing as compared to industry generally. The Baa
aircraft debentures issued in 1958, for example, sold to yield 5.15
per cent to maturity. The market average for bonds of the same class
was slightly lower (5.02 per cent) while the industrial average for
all new issues of rating Baa or higher was 4.31 per cent. The yields
on the subordinated convertible issues has tended to be somewhat lower
than for the straight debentures, averaging 4.19 per cent on the two
issues floated in 1958.
The market assessment of relatively high risk in the aircraft
issues has also lead to the inclusion of a number of limiting terms
and conditions in the bond debentures. Fundamentally, these issues
are unsecured except by the general financial solvency of the firm.
Sinking fund provisions generally are scheduled to redeem a relatively
high percentage of the issue prior to maturity (up to 94 per cent).
Limitations on the creation of additional funded debt are generally
highly restrictive, a typical stipulation being that tangible assets,
after deducting current liabilities, must be at least equal to a high
percentage (275 per cent) of funded debt, including the new issue.
Typically, restrictions are also placed upon sale and lease-back of
facilities, leases and dividends. The following table indicates the
degree of the latter restriction in 1959.
U - -
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TABLE V-3
RETAINED EARNINGS RESTRICTIONS
(Dollars in Millions)
Retained Earnings
1959
$ 88,535
100,562
92,414
37,440
32,643
Retained Earnings
Restricted
$ 49,007
115,674
37,400
16,572
23,671
V. LEVERAGE EFFECTS OF LONG TERM DEBT
The ratings given the debentures issued by the aircraft firms,
the relative high rates of interest demanded and the number of noncost
restrictive terms placed in the indentures, all indicate that a rela-
tively high risk is assessed to the debt issues of these companies.
The risk of long term commitments to substantial future payments of
interest and principal concern not only the investors but the firms as
well. It might be argued, for example, that a present dilution in per
share claims on earnings, arising from the sale of additional stock,
is a better alternative than long term debt commitments in an industry
with a substantial degree of uncertainty as to future sales and earn-
ings levels. The apparent advantage of reducing future risk by this
Firm
Boeing
Douglas
Lockheed
Martin
Northrop
Per Cent
55.4
115.0
40.5
44.3
72.5
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means must be offset against the potential advantage to present stock-
holders of the leverage in earnings per share arising from the profit-
able utilization of borrowed capital, however.
It is impossible, of course, to ascertain the level of expected
future earnings among the aircraft firms with any degree of certainty,
particularly for the analyst outside the firm. However, it is possible
to indicate, in a general way, the approximate ranges within which the
long term debt incurred by the respective aircraft firms will be to
the advantage of the stockholder as compared to securing the same
amount of funds through the sale of stock. The analytical device used
for this purpose is the familiar range of earnings chart depicting the
effect on net earnings per share (EPS) of stock versus bond issues at
various levels of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).
Charts V-ll and V-12 depict ranges of earnings and approximate
earnings per share for four of the aircraft companies at the time
their debentures were issued. Several explicit assumptions are in-
volved in developing these data, the most critical of-which is the
price at which an issue of stock could have been sold to yield the
same amount of funds as the bond issue. For purposes of these approx-
imations, it was assumed that a stock issue could have been sold for
90 per cent of the average market price during the month in which the
28Pearson Hunt, Charles M. Williams, Gordon Donaldson, Basic
Business Finance, (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958) pp. 461-470.
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bonds were issued. The assumption of a lower percentage would have
the effect of increasing the advantage of the bond issue somewhat; the
assumption of a higher percentage would have the reverse effect.
For convenience and simplicity, EBIT is defined as gross earn-
ings before interest on the long term bonds only and the corporate tax
rate was assumed to be 52 per cent. Long term debt interest includes
only the payments made at the coupon rate plus amortization of bond
discount, where applicable, and no provisions are made in the calcula-
tions for the exercise of conversion privileges included in some of
the debentures.
The diagonal parallel lines are the earnings per share which
would be realized for various levels of earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT). The upper line, E/S-Bonds, is the net earnings figure
which would appear in the corporate accounts. The lower line, UE/S-
Bonds, (uncommitted earnings/share) reflects the earnings available for
use in the form of dividends or for retention in the business after
deducting mandatory sinking fund payments. The diagonal line which
intersects the parallel lines (E/S-Stock), reflects the impact upon
earnings per share of securing the same amount of funds through the
sale of stock under the assumptions noted above.
For levels of EBIT lower than the intersection point A, earn-
ings per share are seen to be higher for the stock than for the bond
issues. In the range of EBIT between points A and B, the earnings per
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share are higher for the bond issue than for a stock issue, reflecting
the leverage of the borrowed funds. However, the stock issue is still
advantageous as compared to the uncommitted earnings per share on the
bond issue available for dividends or retention in the firm during the
period when sinking fund payments must be made. Beyond point B, the
leverage of the bond issue is favorable in terms of both measures.
For both Boeing and Douglas, the crossover point B is relative-
ly high as compared to both the average and the range of earnings from
1955 to 1959. The Lockheed and Northrop data, Figure V-12, show much
more favorable comparisons as the crossover point B is less than aver-
age earnings for 1955-59 and is nearer the lower end of the range of
these earnings. The approximate debt coverage on these issues is
indicated by comparing the intercept of the lower of the two parallel
lines with the horizontal axis to the range of earnings shown. Aver-
age EBIT ranges from about 2.7 to 5.0 times interest and sinking fund
payments.
VI. SUMMARY
In general terms, the foregoing analyses showed a pattern of
internal fund flows which were sufficient to supply total needs for
increases in working capital through the mid-1950's. However, after
that time, total requirements exceeded internal capacity to provide
funds, resulting in recourse to the external funds market, principally
through the issue of long term debentures.
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During the early 1950's, total requirements for funds did not
increase as rapidly as sales. The ratio of current assets to sales
tended to decline during the early 1950's, but leveled out during the
latter 1950's, in the range of 25 per cent to 30 per cent. The ratio
of current assets to current liabilities also generally declined dur-
ing the early 1950's, but tended to level out during the latter 1950's
in the range of 1.50 to 1.75. As a result of these two factors, the
slack in net working capital, available at the beginning of the period,
had been taken up by 1951 or 1952. After this time, total working
capital increased at a rather steady rate through 1959. Internal
sources of funds contributed most of the increase through the mid
1950's, but were unable to meet demand after that time. Nearly all of
the total additions to net working capital after 1955 were from ex-
ternal sources. For the total period 1948-1959, over one-half of the
total increase in net working capital was provided by external fund
sources.
The major source of externally supplied funds was the issue of
long term debentures, although two major stock issues were floated.
The debentures were unsecured sinking fund issues, generally being used
in a combination of straight and subordinated convertible issues.
These issues received low ratings (Baa and Ba respectively), carried
relatively high interest rates, and contained a number of provisions
in the indentures restricting the financial operations of the firms
involved.
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An analysis of the leverage of the bond issues as compared to a
stock issue of comparable size indicated that a stock issue was gener-
ally advantageous up to relatively high earnings levels, as compared
to performance from 1955-1959.
The foregoing analyses of the debt position of the aircraft
firms indicate a rather low debt tolerance. The low ratings, high
cost and restrictive provisions associated with the current issues,
together with relatively high debt versus equity breakeven points, all
indicate that most additional external financing which may be required
can be expected to come from equity sources. This is particularly
true for those firms with current long term debt outstanding. Should
the price of the aircraft stocks rise sufficiently to induce substan-
tial conversion of the convertible issues, however, some of this
pressure on debt position would be reduced.
mhz~~
Chapter VI
THE RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
The previous two chapters have dealt with the behavioral pat-
terns of both internal and external sources and uses of funds. These
patterns are the result of many operational and policy decisions re-
lating to choices among many potential alternative fund uses and fund
sources. Ultimately, however, the criterion against which these
choices must be made and evaluated is the resulting marginal return on
investment as compared to the marginal cost of the capital utilized.
If the marginal return is higher than marginal cost, then the stock-
holder's position is enhanced. If the converse is true, then the
stockholder's position deteriorates. The purpose of this chapter is
to evaluate the performance of the eight aircraft firms being studied
with respect to this relationship. In effect, this evaluation summar-
izes the impact upon the firm of all of the fund flows analyzed
separately in the preceding chapters.
The problem of analyzing marginal return on investment and the
marginal cost of capital will be discussed from both the theoretical
and practicable points of view as they relate to the operational prob-
lem within the firm and the analyst outside the firm. Following this
introduction, an analysis of marginal return on investment and margin-
al cost of capital among the eight firms is presented, based upon the
Gordon and Shapiro model of the form:
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P ( Y )(B)
mentioned in Chapter IV. This model hypothesizes that, with certain
limitations, the cost of capital is defined by the market rate of
discount, k, on expected earnings and that the return on investment is
Y 29 Ydefined by the return on book value, . Values of k and - areB B
derived for the aircraft firms being studied and interpreted in terms
of the theoretical economic model of marginal return and marginal
cost.
I. THE PROBLEM OF ANALYSIS
It is appropriate to consider this problem first from a
theoretical point of view. In essence, the problem is one of classic-
al marginal economics, or in business terms, one of capital budgeting.
Theoretically, the management of a firm should draw up a schedule of
alternative investment opportunities, rank them in order of decreasing
potential return, and cut the investment off where this schedule
crosses a similar schedule of increasing capital costs. At this
point, where marginal return on investment is equal to the marginal
cost of capital, the return to the stockholders would be maximized.3
This process may be illustrated by an analogy to the economist's fam-
iliar supply and demand curves.
2 9Myron J. Gordon and Eli Shapiro, op.cit., pp. 106-108.
Ibid., pp. 108-109.
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From a practicable point of view, however, the problem of funds
management is not nearly so clear cut as is its theoretical concep-
tion. Lack of knowledge concerning alternative opportunities, inher-
ent errors in forecasting, lack of criteria for measuring return on so-
called "strategic investment" (e.g., a plant cafeteria), the inertia
involved in dividend policy and the lack of objective criteria for
evaluating many types of capital cost all contribute to the complexity
of the problem. In the face of these difficulties, managements have
typically turned to devices such as an arbitrary rate of return after
taxes, average rate of return on total capital, payoff period, average
cost of capital, and other related criteria by means of which to estab-
lish a capital budget cut-off point.
From the point of view of the analyst outside the firm, the
problems of evaluating funds utilization are even more difficult. In
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addition to the uncertainties faced by the internal management of a
firm, he lacks basic knowledge concerning much of the data and manage-
ment criteria upon which decisions concerning fund flows were based.
He does not know, for example, of the marginally profitable investment
opportunities which were passed up for other than purely financial
reasons.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the problem remains of finding
some objective criteria for comparing investment return and cost
within the firm on the one hand, and for comparing investment risk
among firms on the other. Traditionally, the measurement of the rela-
tionship of net earnings to stock price in the secondary securities
market, E/P, and the dividend yield, D/P, have been used to assess
relative risk and return. Both of these measures are subject to a
high degree of qualification for the purpose intended, however.
The total net earnings yield, E/P, does not recognize that the
earnings of the firm are not payments made to the stockholder and the
dividend yield does not recognize that the yield per share can be
expected to increase if retained earnings are profitably employed.
Accordingly, neither of these measures provide a practicable link
between investment return and cost, nor do they provide realistic com-
parative measures of expectations of return (relative risk) among
firms 31
3 1Ibid., p. 104.
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The Gordon and Shapiro formulation overcomes a great many of
these difficulties, at least in part. The approach suggested is of
particular value to the outside analyst as the formulation utilizes
information available to the public. It will be recalled that the
rate of return on a share of stock was defined32 as
k =D (Y-D)(Y)P ( Y )(B)
and that the rate of return to the stockholder would be maximized when
the marginal rate of return on investment in the firm was equal to the
marginal capital cost, i.e., the rate of discount (k) applied by the
market to an anticipated future income stream. The problem is to
assess the meaning of the values of k in terms of marginal investment
criteria. This cannot be accomplished directly for reasons discussed
previously.
It may be seen that there are many possibilities for changing
the relationships among the factors included in the foregoing formulae
from one time period to the next. Earnings may increase or decrease
from the previous level. The distribution of earnings as between div-
idends and retained earnings is subject to change from one period to
the next, causing corresponding changes in book value. Market prices
may change with respect to all of these factors, as between firms in
the industry or with respect to the market generally. The expectation
of total future income stream may become more or less optimistic,
changing the rate at which the stream is discounted at any given
3 2Ibid., p. 107.
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current income level. At any one point in time, there do not exist a
sufficient number of simultaneous equations to definitively separate
the effects of interactions among the foregoing elements. However, it
is possible to draw some general conclusions regarding changes in
these factors with respect to direction and relative position. It is
helpful to consider these relationships as they exist in the special
case where market price P is equal to book value, B.
At this position of equilibrium it may be shown that the growth
Y
rate of profit k is equal to the current return on book value - asB
follows:33
P Y B ' D
It is useful to consider what may happen to alter this equilib-
rium. First, if a change is made in the ratio of earnings to book
value by annual additions, such that
Y+'Y )Y
B+AB B
then k must increase, all other things being equal. The interpreta-
tion of this result is that the market is assessing the higher level
of increased earnings at a higher rate of discount. Alternatively,
price may move upward, with k remaining constant. Qualitatively, this
implies a more optimistic attitude on the part of the market with re-
spect to the total expected future income stream, based upon the
3bid., p. 107.
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current higher level of earnings. It is also possible that both k and
P will move upward to some intermediate position.
It is significant to note that an upward movement in either k
or P implies a market assessment of a higher marginal rate of return
than the previous level. The effect of changes in distribution of
earnings is implicit in the denominator of the rate of return fraction,
Y
B or B+AB. As a generalization, it may be shown that when P)B, k(
and conversely for P(B, k) as follows:
Let P = B+
D + (Y-D) (Y)_ Y D
- B+, ( Y ) (B)~ B B(B+A)
D ce
The fraction B(BS) will be negative when C( is positive, i.e., P>B,
making k(. The fraction will be positive, however, if ( is negative,
P(B, making k>g.
Y
The foregoing discussion suggests that the ratio of I to kB
would provide a meaningful, objective criteria for comparing the
marginal return on capital ) to marginal capital cost, k, both for
individual firms from year to year and among firms for a longer per-
iod. The higher the ratio, the less is the relative discount being
applied to the current return on book value as an indication of future
Y
earnings streams. It should be remembered, however, that - is the sumB
of a great number of individual margin rates in the current year and
does not reflect the marginal return on any single investment over time.
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An important qualification inherent in the formulation dis-
cussed above is that the value of k is dependent upon using the current
rate of growth as an estimate of future growth. For some specific
purposes, another estimate of this rate such as past average rate, may
be superior.34 However, as present interests include knowing how this
rate has changed over the period being studied, the formulation
presented will be utilized, recognizing that inferences drawn from
such use are subject to the qualifications noted. Further, most data
will be averaged for the period under study, thereby eliminating much
of the potential objection to utilizing the formulation as stated.
II. THE REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Figures VI-1 and VI-2 show the computed values of k for the
large and small companies, broken down into its component elements
D Y-D
D and B . The over-all trend of k is generally downward throughoutP B
this period, both because the dividend yield is decreasing and because
the ratio of retained earnings to book value has declined since the
middle 1950's. The patterns are quite erratic, particularly for the
small firms.
Average values of k for the entire period are shown in the
following table, eliminating the years of net loss.
Ibid., p. 106-107.
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TABLE VI-1
COMPUTED VALUES OF k
k D/P RE/B
Large Firms, Total 16.1 6.6 9.5
Boeing 17.4 5.4 12.0
Douglas 14.7 7.2 7.5
Lockheed 14.9 6.3 8.6
North America 17.2 7.5 9.7
Small Firms, Total 22.7 4.7 18.0
Grumman 13.5 7.9 5.6
Martin 24.7 2.5 22.2
McDonnell 28.1 3.1 25.0
Northrop 24.5 5.4 19.1
Moody's 125 Industrials 11.9 5.0 6.9
Generally, the value of k for large firms is lower than for small
firms, indicating a higher discount rate applied to expected future
earnings of smaller companies than for the larger companies. Within
each size group, the lowest value of k is indicated for the company
with the highest payout ratio. Correspondingly, the firms with lowest
payout ratios have the highest value of k. Probably most significant
is the fact that the value of k for both groups of aircraft companies
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is substantially higher than for the industrials generally, by a
factor of 55 per cent for the large firms and 90 per cent for the
small firms. These data tend to reinforce the findings concerning
relative stock price dependence on current dividends and retained
earnings discussed previously.
Generally, the theory discussed heretofore would suggest that
an increasing slope in the ratio - k over time indicates an increasingB
marginal return on capital with respect to stock market rate of profit
on investment criteria. Conversely, a decreasing slope would indicate
a diminishing return. It is emphasized, however, that the ratio re-
flects the market discount on investment, not the management's fore-
cast of marginal return on any year's capital budget. Offsetting this
disadvantage of indirect measurement, however, is the advantage of
providing a summary evaluation of the separate factors of sales, asset
growth, earnings, dividends and retained earnings discussed heretofore.
Charts VI-3 and VI-4 show the annual ratios of i k for each ofB
the large and small companies respectively. For the large companies,
the trend is generally upward at a rate relatively similar to the
Moody's 125 Industrial average shown in the lower right hand corner..
It will be noted, however, that the aircraft ratios are generally lower
than the industrial average, reflecting the higher market discount as-
sessed to current marginal return for the aircraft firms.
The similarity of upward trend as between the large firms and
the industrial average lends some quantitative support to the qualitative
statements made earlier regarding the generally more stable outlook for
MITE.
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the larger firms in the industry during this period. Had the market
assessment of the increase in earnings and dividends been more pes-
simistic with respect to long run expectations, the theory presented here
would indicate that a higher discount rate k would have been applied
to current earnings and dividends, resulting in lower ratios of / k.B*
In this regard, it is significant that the ratios did not generally ex-
ceed 1.0 until 1953, about the time when the long run implications of a
continuing cold war status and the introduction of ballistic missile
technology were realized generally. It should also be noted, however,
that some portion of the decrease in the value of k is caused by the
general upward trend in market prices during this period.
The smaller firms show a significantly different pattern in the
ratios of Y /k. With the exception of Grumman, the firm with the high
BY
payout ratio, values of Y k have tended to remain much closer to 1.0
than for the large firms. By analogy with the interpretation given
for the large firms, this implies a much higher rate of discount k
is being assessed to current earnings and dividends as indicative of
long run expectations than for the market generally or for the large
aircraft firms. It seems probable that this factor is a reflection of
the relatively more erratic pattern of the small firms noted throughout
this chapter. These patterns also correlate in a general way with the
findings concerning the relationship between price, dividends and re-
tained earnings wherein the multiple correlation was relatively high
among these factors when actual price was used, but was significantly
lower when price was adjusted for market trend. Conversely, correla-
tions for the larger firms generally improved.
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III. SUMMARY
One final comparative calculation relative to price, earnings,
dividends and retained earnings is worthwhile for purposes of compar-
ing relative performance among the firms being studied. One disad-
Y
vantage of using the annual calculations for - and k, either annuallyB
or as averages of annual data, is that the value of k becomes highly
suspect in the years in which low earnings or net losses were incurred.
In all of the foregoing calculations, these data were excluded. If,
however, one regards the twelve year span being studied as one account-
ing period, analogous to considering the annual data as an accumulation
of monthly profits and losses, these years may be included and more
meaningful long run averages derived. The following table shows these
calculations for the eight firms being studied wherein D/P is the
Y-D
average dividend yield for the period, -j- is the percentage of earn-
Y
ings retained and - is the average earnings/share divided by averageB
book value per share.
-I
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TABLE VI-2
Y
AVERAGE VALUES OF k and E~
Percentages
k D/P Y-D Y Y/k
__ Y B B
Large Firms, Total 15.8 6.5 55.2 15.9 100.6
Boeing 18.0 5.4 69.6 18.1 100.6
Douglas 11.6 6.8 39.5 12.2 105.2
Lockheed 14.6 6.3 57.6 14.4 98.3
North American 18.7 7.5 53.9 18.7 100.0
Small Firms, Total 15.0 4.5 62.3 15.9 106.0
Grumman 13.4 8.0 35.6 15.3 114.2
Martin 5.0 2.5 60.0 4.2 84.2
McDonnell 23.8 3.1 86.3 24.0 100.8
Northrop 17.9 4.5 67.4 79.9 111.1
Looking at column k, it will be noted that the average values
of k for large and small firms are nearly equal. Considerable differ-
ences in average discount rates exist within each group, however. For
large firms, the average rates range from 11.6 to 18.7. For small
firms the range is much wider, from 5.0, a value of doubtful meaning,
to 23.8.
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In all but two cases, the average ratio of - to k is greater
than 1, indicating that the average return on capital has generally
been higher than the rate of profit demanded by the market. Signif-
icantly, the highest ratios exist for those companies with the highest
dividend payout ratio. Based upon the previous discussion, the
inference to be drawn from this analysis is that companies having a
ratio of less than 100 would have maximized the position of the stock-
holder had a greater percentage of earnings been paid out in dividends.
Conversely, the firms with a ratio greater than 100 could have profit-
ably retained a greater portion of earnings for use in the enterprise.
Returning to the marginal decision theory introduced in the latter
part of this chapter, the foregoing conclusion may be illustrated
graphically as shown below,
k
Rate of
Return RI
~Y y
B
Investment
Y-D
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Y
k being defined as the cost of retained earnings and - the return on
YB
net worth. Firms with values of Y >k are to the left of a position ofB
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equality between these two marginal rates, say Rl. Fkrms with values
of (k stand to the right of the position of equality. It follows,
therefore, that the proportion of earnings retained could have been
increased and decreased respectively to the benefit of the stockholders.
The foregoing conclusions are subject to the qualifications
concerning the use of current yield rates as a measure of the market
discount k. However, as the data in the preceding table are averages
for a fairly long time period, it is believed that this difficulty has
been substantially overcome. One further qualification also needs to
be made concerning the data. While believed to be valid for the pur-
pose used, it is obvious that the specific values of k in relation to
price are subject to the influence of other factors, principal among
which is the debt-equity position of the firm. Further, the relative
amounts of fixed and working capital varies among firms. Therefore,
due caution needs to be exercised in interpreting these data, partic-
ularly in making detailed interfirm comparisons or in drawing infer-
ences concerning return on fixed assets.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the foregoing chapters, the principal elements of corporate
sources and uses of funds for eight representative firms from the
traditional aircraft industry have been examined in some detail. In-
cluded in the study of these fund flows were comparisons of absolute and
relative magnitude evaluations of patterns of flow with respect to time
and analyses of various interrelationships among dependent flows. The
purpose of this chapter is to summarize the results of these analyses
and to draw such conclusions as are appropriate regarding the future
implications of these findings.
In broad outline, the financial analysis of the aircraft industry
since World War II presented in this paper consisted of three major
elements. Chapters II and III dealt with the general economic, market and
industry framework within which the aircraft companies have operated in
recent years. Chapter IV and V presented historical data relative to in-
ternal and external sources and uses of funds, respectively, together
with analyses of these patterns of flow as they related to dividend policy,
the market price of common stock and the capital structure of the firms
studied. The analyses in Chapter VI considered the implications of these
sources and uses of funds from the points of view of return on investment
and cost of capital. The results of the foregoing analyses were summarized
in the final section of each chapter and need not be repeated here in
detail. It is appropriate, however, to review these findings in a broader
perspective as they relate to the future of the industry.
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The major economic fact relating to the aircraft industry during
the past decade has been the marked increase in level of activity. With-
out exception, every relevant index of activity reflects a substantial
response to the demands of the Korean buildup, the continuing status of
the cold war and the increased importance of commercial aviation. With-
in this aggregate framework, significant changes have occured in product
mix, competitive environment and market structure.
Earnings patterns showed a high degree of variability, generally
increasing through the mid-1950's, but declining thereafter. The decline
was more precipitous for the larger firms than for the small, due largely
to the heavy initial losses sustained on commercial jet programs. Divi-
dend payouts reflected greater stability and were more conservative than
for the corporate universe as a whole.
Rates of adjustment in dividend payments to changes in levels of
earnings were found to be higher for the larger firms than for other
industrial groups which have been studied, although the rate of adjust-
ment for small firms was somewhat lower than for other industrial groups.
The analysis of the dependency of market price upon dividends and re-
tained earnings showed a high dependency on the former as compared to the
latter.
Expenditure for the purchase of plant and equipment showed marked
increases as the level of activity increased, particularly through the
latter 1950's. Annual expenditures generally exceeded returning fund
flows from depreciation, resulting in a substantial increase in net fixed
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assets during the period studied, both in absolute amounts and as a
percentage of net worth.
The net effect of the foregoing patterns of internal fund
flow permitted increased requirements for funds (i.e., net working
capital) to be met almost exclusively from internal sources through
the mid 1950's. During the latter 1950's, however, declines in earn-
ings, coupled with increased requirements for fixed asset investments
and working capital, required that all the aircraft firms seek ex-
ternal sources of funds.
With the exception of two major stock issues and exchanges
of stock attributable to acquisitions, these funds were secured pri-
marily by means of long-term debt. Five of the eight firms studied
issued long-term sinking fund debentures, some of which provided for
conversion into common stock. These debentures were rated compara-
tively low on the scale of bond investment risk (Baa and Ba) and con-
tained several types of restrictions in the indentures which limit
the financial operations of the firms involved. The advantage of the
potential earnings leverage on equity resulting from these issues
was found to be somewhat above average earnings for the period 1955-
1959 on an over-all basis. By 1959, the ratio of debt to equity
stood at 26 per cent.
As defined by the model of the rate of profit at which a share
of common stock is selling, cost of capital averaged about 16 per cent
for the aircraft firms during the period studied. Return on investment
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averaged slightly higher on a composite basis. The ratio of return
on investment to cost of capital steadily improved throughout the
period, however, indicating an increasingly effective use of funds
as compared to stock market demands for return.
By the end of 1959, then, the firms studied were generally
in a financial posture reflecting high annual sales; less than desir-
able and highly uncertain future earnings levels; a high proportion
of net worth invested in fixed assets; a substantial commitment of
future earnings to debt retirement; and a capital structure, both
debt and equity, which requires high earnings levels if the stock-
holder is to benefit from the continued use of these funds. The
future implications of the foregoing factors as indicated by the
analysis of fund flows presented in this paper are the subject of
the balance of this chapter.
For ease of exposition, the situation with respect to the
group of the four largest firms will be used for illustrative pur-
ppses. However, the general conclusions drawn apply to the small
firm as well, recognizing that differences among individual firms
in both groups would not make these conclusions equally applicable
in all cases at the company level.
As of the end of 1959, the book value of the four large firms
totalled approximately $700 million. Although it is not known what
the future level of stock prices will be, or what the associated im-
plicit requirement for return on investment will be over the next
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ten years, it would seem reasonable to assume that the required rate
of return on investment will be near, or perhaps slightly less, than
the average over the past ten years.
If the general level of stock market prices continues to in-
crease and the aircraft industry were to continue to experience a
relatively high degree of over-all stability, the requirement for
return on investment could be expected to decrease. If, on the
other hand, either of these conditions does not prevail, or if
earnings in the industry do not improve, the rate could be expected
to increase.
The possibilities suggest that for analytical purposes a rea-
sonable estimate of the range of required return on investment might
be somewhat above the past Moody's Industrial average, say 12.5 per
cent to a level above the past average experience, say 17.5 per cent,
with an average (15 per cent) slightly lower than past experience.
Based upon this range of alternative conditions, it is possi-
ble to project the average level of earnings required over the next
ten years to justify the present capital structures of the four large
firms. These projections are shown on the upper half of Figure VII-1
as'straight line increases from the 1955-1959 average earnings levels.
It is emphasized that these projections assume no increase in the net
worth of the firms, in other words, a 100 per cent dividend payout.
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The average earnings required range from $87.5 to $105 to
$122.5 million for a 12.5, 15.0 and 17.5 per cent return on investment,
respectively. For comparison, the average earnings for these four
firms during the period 1955-1959 was approximately $89.0 million.
As can be seen, this range of earnings requirements represents a
substantial recovery from 1959 levels. For the highest rate of re-
turn (17.5 per cent), earnings must increase on an average of 6.3 per
cent per year in order to justify the present capital structure on
an economic basis.
A more useful way of looking at the earnings requirement prob-
lem, however, is shown in the lower half of Figure VII-l. This chart
shows the average required earnings levels through the next ten years
Y
for various values of return on investment, Y and k, as related to a
range of possible dividend payout policies. These calculations assume
that the only additions to net worth are made by earnings retentions.
The upper diagonal line is the same data as shown in the upper
chart, i.e., 100 per cent dividend payout. The lower three lines
represent 60 per cent, 30 per cent and no dividend payout policies,
respectively. As may be seen, for any given value of required return
on investment, the average level of earnings required increases as
dividend payout decreases, i.e., as funds are increasingly added to
net worth.
For example, the average earnings requirement at the level of
15 per cent return on investment with 100 per cent dividend payout is
r
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$105 million. With a 60 per cent payout (i.e., 40 per cent retention)
the average earnings requirement increases to about $111 million. A
30 per cent dividend payout policy aimed at higher retention of earn-
ings, increases the average earnings requirement to $116 million,
while retention of 100 per cent of earnings increases this value to
about $121 million. In terms of percentage variations, the difference
in earnings requirements between 100 per cent dividend payout and no
dividend payout is about 15 per cent. In the range of relevant payout
values, from 30-60 per cent, the difference in earnings requirements
is about 4.5 per cent. In other words, a 4.5 per cent error of esti-
mate in expected average earnings levels over the next ten years
would, theoretically, influence dividend payout policy to the extent
of 100 per cent. Correspondingly, a 4.5 per cent error of estimate
in the expected average return on investment requirement over the
next ten years would have a somewhat greater effect on dividend policy
from a theoretical point of view.
As noted heretofore, however, a reliable estimate of expected
earnings and required return on investment over the next ten years
is extremely difficult to make with any degree of certainty. It could
not be expected that these values could be forecast within 4.5 per cent.
In view of this circumstance, it would seem that relatively marginal
differences in dividend payout policy could not be justified on the
basis of differences in long-run earnings or required returns on in-
vestment of less than 15-20 per cent. It would seem, however, that
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prudent financial policy would dictate that decisions depending upon
these factors would be made on the basis of conservative return on
investment estimates.
The analysis of funds flows presented in this paper suggest
three other criteria, however. The first is the gross criteria as
to whether or not future earnings can be expected to be near, or
somewhat higher, than the 1955-1959 average. If so, some degree of
earnings retention would seem justified. If not, however, a high
dividend payout policy seems desirable if the position of the stock-
holder is to be maximized.
Second, within the range of high versus low dividend payout
policies, the fundamental criteria would seem to be the anticipated
liquidity position of the firm from two points of view. As noted
in the section of Chapter IV dealing with investment in fixed assets,
an increasing proportion of net worth has been used for this purpose.
If the level of activity is expected to continue to increase during
the next decade, net investment in fixed assets can also be expected
to increase, based on past experience and the termination of the
accelerated amortization provisions in the tax law. Further, net
working capital requirements could be expected to increase also and
funds must be provided for sinking fund payments. Unless earnings
retentions were maintained at a relatively high level under these con-
ditions, the liquidity position of the various firms would deteriorate
in a manner similar to the experience of the industry in the late 1950's,
I ~1
resulting in further recourse to external sources of funds.
Third, and coupled with the foregoing two factors, it is
apparent that the long-term debt tolerance of the aircraft firms is
comparatively low. This would seem to preclude further long-term
borrowing by the firms with currently outstanding debentures without
substantial improvements in their net worth position. This condition,
coupled with potential liquidity requirements, indicates that addi-
tional equity must be obtained in the event of continued expansion
in level of activity. The available alternatives are earnings reten-
tions and the sale of stock. If the prospect of higher levels of
activity and corresponding increased earnings are relatively high,
then the alternative of earnings retention seem justified. If, however,
the probability of these prospects is marginal, high dividend payout
ratios are indicated, hedged by the availability of funds through the
sale of stock should the outlook for the future prove to be too
pessimistic.
Assuming that earnings are expected to increase a reasonable
amount during the next decade, therefore, the above factors argue for
a relatively high earnings retention policy and correspondingly, a
low dividend payout policy. If, however, the expectation of increased
earnings during the next ten years is marginally probable, these same
factors, plus the high dependence of stock price upon dividends, argue
for providing liquidity by reducing capital expenditures to levels
below returning fund flows from depreciation; decreasing the amount of
150
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funds tied up in net working capital; and paying out a relatively
higher proportion of earnings in dividends. The abllity to accom-
plish the latter is constrained, however, by the retained earnings
restrictions contained in the indentures of outstanding bonds.
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A P P E N D I X
PREFACE
Following are the codes applicable to the sources and uses
of funds data in this appendix. Explanations of the data included
under each heading are set forth on the following page.
Sources
* 1 From Current Operations
la Reported Earnings
2 Non-Funds Expenses
2a Depreciation
2b Sale of Plant and Equipment, etc.
2c Other Asset Decreases
3 Sale of Stock
4 Additions to Long Term Debt
5 Other Liability Increases
6 Retained Earnings Adjustments
USES
7 Cash Dividends
8 Purchase of Plant and Equipment
9 Stock Purchases
10 Retirement of Long Term Debt
11 Other Asset Increases
12 Other Liability Decreases
13 Retained Earnings Adjustments.
EXPLANATION OF ITEMS
Reported Earnings - for the current year's operations, prior to
adjustment for changes reflecting the operations of previous
years.
Depreciation - gross depreciation for the current year.
Sale of Plant and Equipment, etc. - this is a balancing item
reflecting the net difference between the prior end of year
balance in the net fixed asset account plus net additions made
during the current year and the net fixed asset balance reported
at the end of the current year. As such this item includes
sales of plant and equipment, retirements and other adjustments
made in the gross fixed asset and gross depreciation accounts
when such actions involved an asset having a net balance between
cost and accumulated depreciation.
Other Asset Increases or Decreases - self explanatory.
Sale of Stock - includes all additions made to the capital stock and
capital surplus accounts not resulting from transfers from
capital surpluses.
Additions to or Retirement of Long Term Debt - self explanatory.
Other Liability Increases or Decreases - self explanatory.
Retained Earnings Adjustments - these adjustments result principally
from refunds or additional payments of taxes attributable to
prior years or reductions in contingencies established in prior
years.
Cash Dividends - self explanatory.
Stock Purchase - For Treasury stock.
APPENDIX A
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS SUMMARY
LARGE FIRMS
Total
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
775,628
271,836
16,754
14,j.341
78,9798
216,653
11,74
5,71
1,9391,v535
336,720
540,921
0
29,156
53,692
11,742
14,573
986,804
404,731
1,391,535
See preface
18,073
58,315
1,193
1,010
15,210
0
0
0
93,801
32,165
80,015
0
6,506
23,552
1,097
407
143,742
(49,941)
93,801
to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
1958
91,550
55,195
1,887
0
12,712
130,546
0
0
291,890
Uses
1957
118,998
43,563
1,472
8,245
1,031
27,900
1,448
0
202,657
1956
109,171
28,942
2,999
0
45,173
28,220
0
2,500
217,005
1955
108,287
22,431
1,680
592
95
29,987
1,845
0
164,917
49,283
42,650
0
0
205
0
7,778
99,916
65,001
164,917
36,367
61,292
0
9,781
10,907
1,881
2,992
123,220
168,670
291,890
44,627
112,983
0
104
4,619
0
2,196
164,529
38,128
202,657
43,020
99,939
0
0
1,321
773
1,200
146,253
70,752
217,005
APPENDIX A
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS SUMMARY
LARGE FIRMS (CONTINUED)
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
1954
117,759
18,629
1,680
0
1,949
0
0
653
140,017
42,352
30,383
0
0
3,024
1,318
0
77,077
62,940
140,017
1952
67,139
15,180
1,027
0
744
0
0
0
86,150
23,491
26,554
0
0
2,911
1,447
0
54,403
31,747
86,150
10,355
3, 087
2
164
0
1,931
0
55,331
15,870
29,369
0
0
2,142
0
0
47,381
1951
26,269
6,362
1,124L
1,87d
782
0
3,378
0
39,881
14,229
33,467
0
0
2,629
0
0
50,325
7,950 (10,444)
55,331 39,881
1950
33,337
4,599
1,211
226
924
0
0
2,000
41,540
14,601
10,046
0
3,334
907
3,226
0
32,114
9,426
41,540
1949
22,724
4,152
454
902
14
0
2,280
0
29,832
13,301
7,522-
0
6,715
891
0
0
28,429
1,403
29,832
this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
1948
20,566
4,113
(240)
1,486
0
0
861
628
28,514
7,414
6,701
0
2,716
584
2,000
0
19,419
9,099
28,514
See preface to
U
APPENDIX B
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
BOEI NG
Total
Sources
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Use s
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
237,954
73,292
1,392
1,196
6,962
70,546
0
3,128
394,470
69,271
148,173
0
1
1,915
2,000
13,104
234,464
160 ,006
394,470
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
1959
12,436
19,121
63
140
2,191
0
0
0
33,951
7,361
17,516
0
1
0
0
380
25,258
8,693
33,951
1958
29,360
18,738
258
0
3,101
70,546
0
0
122,003
7,017
16,782
0
0
1,755
0
2,750
28,304
93,699
122,003
1957.
38,160
12,422
23
0
930
0
0
0
51,535
6,681
45,043
0
0
0
0
2,196
53,920
(2, 385)
51,535
1956
32,135
6,238
12
0
740
0
0
2,500
41,625
8,162
30,848
0
0
0
0
0
39,010
2,615
41,b2-5
1955
30,391
4,925
57
0
0
0
0
0
35,816
10,579
7,521
0
0
0
0
7,778
25, b78
9, 938
35, b1b
I-a
APPENDIX B
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
BOEING (CONTINUED)
Sources
1
la
2
2a.
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
1954
36,976
4,031
416
0
0
0
0
0
41,423
9,729
5,062
0
0 '
21
0
0
14,612
26,611
41,423
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes
1953
20,318
2,796
161
0
0
0
0
0
23,275
5,677
8,010
0
0
34
0
0
13,721
9,554
23,275
1952
14,084
1,642
129
2
0
0
0
0
15,657
4,325
6,745
0
0
0
0
0
11,070
4,787
15,857
1951
7,141
1,198
91
0
0
0
0
0
8,430
3,247
5,174
0
0
105
0
0
5,526
(96)
8,430
1950
10,526
804
74
220
0
0
0
0
11,924
3,247
2,909
0
0
0
0
0
6,156
5,768
11,924
1949
4,411
713
85
357
0
0
0
0
5 ,5b6
2,164
1,413
0
0
0
0
0
3,577
1,989
5,566
1948
1,716
664
23
34
0
0
0
0
3,065
1,082
1,150
0
0
0
2,000
0
4,232
(1,167)
3,065
0'a
I
APPENDIX C
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
DOUGLAS
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes. P--,
Tot al
166,116
69,174
10,390
8,270
1,826
87,900
150
2,653
346,479
102,306
128,692
0
4,765
11,835
1,150
0
247,748
98,731
346,479
1959
(33,822)
13,283
923
0
0
0
0
0
(19,616)
3,817
9,500
0
0
210
0
0
13,527
(33,143)
(19,6blb)
1958
16,847
12,624
807
0
0
60,000
0
0
90,278
9,320
14,400
0
0
297
0
0
24,017
66,261
90,278
1957
30,665
10,04±
1,117
8,245
0
27,900
0
0
77,968
14,823
29,400
0
0
0
0
0
44,223
33,745
77,968
1956
33,202
7,760
2,339
0
0
0
0
0
43,567
14,822
23,600
0
0
1,295
0
0
39,717
43,567
1955
28,215
6,576
1,124
0
0
0
0
0
35,915
v,759
s,500
0
0
205
0
0
23,464
12,451
35,915
APPENDIX C
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
DOUGLAS (CONTINUED)
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Use s
78
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
1954
36,157
5,074
678
0
1,431
0
0
653
43,993
15,954
11,894
0
0
1,601
0
0
29,449
14,544
43,993
1953
18,586
3,903
1,216
0
129
0
0
0
23,834
7,8±1
6,434
0
0
2,305
0
0
16,550
7,284
23,834
1952
10,792
3,076
1,218
0
0
0
0
0
15,086
4 ,500
,978
0
0
1,814
0
0
15,292
1951
6,913
1,917
713
0
0
0
0
0
9,543
4,200
11,599
0
0
3,524
0
0
18,323
(206) (8,780)
15,086 9,543
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes
ON
1950
7,215
1,565
250
6
0
0
0
2,000
11,036
3,750
2,324
0
3,334
0
1,150
0
10,558
478
11,036
1949
5,516
1,505(449)
19
0
0
75
0
6,666
5,550
1,242
0
715
0
0
0
7,507
(841)
6,666
5,830
1,850
454
0
0
0
0
8,209
3,000
821
0
716
584
0
0
5,121
3,088
8,209
APPENDIX D
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
LOCKHEED
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
Grand Total
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes
Total
147,704
66,780
2,844
3,287
24,183
58,207
11,594
0
314,599
62,017
130,331
0
24,390
39,840
8,592
1,469
266,639
47,960
314,599
1959
8,733
13,084
490
0
9,591
0
0
0
31,898
8,030
22,402
0
6,505
23,342
1,097
27
61,403
(29,505)
31,898
18,557
12,181
44
0
9,603
0
0
0
40,785
7,206
15,290
0
9,781
7,753
1,881
242
42,153
(1,368)
1957.
16,309
10,695
196
0
101
0
1,448
0
28,749
7,093
18,781
0
104
4,619
0
0
30,597
(1,848)
28,749
1956
15,073
8,162
627
0
1,776
28,220
0
0
53,858
6,812
21,808
0
0
26
773
1,200
30,619
23,239
53,858
17,332
5,753
103
149
95
29,987
1,845
0
55,264
8,487
15,294
0
0
0
0
0
23,781
31,483
55,264
APPENDIX D
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
LOCKHEED (CONTINUED)
Sources
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
1954
22,446
4,692
96
0
518
0
0
0
27,752
7,222
7,423
0
0
1,402
1,318
0
17,365
10,387
27,752
1953
15,462
3,316
137
0
615
0
0
0
20,030
4,851
6,198
0
0
572
1,447
0
13,068
6,962
20,030
1952
9,058
2,892
(241)
0
164
0
1,931
0
13,804
2,751
6,230
0
0
328
0
0
9,309
4,495
13,804
1951
5,793
1,722
399
1,854
782
0
3,379
0
13,929
2,488
8,020
0
0
0
0
0
10,508
3,421
13,929
1950
7,210
1,317
108
0
924
0
0
0
9,559
3,311
3,745
0
0
907
2,076
0
10,039
1949
1,249
130
0
14
0
2,205
0
9,089
2,152
2,479
0
6,000
891
0
0
11,522
(480) (2,433)
9,559 9,089
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes 1-"
1948
6,240
1,217
355
1,284
0
0
786
0
9,882
1,614
2,661
0
2,000
0
0
0
6,275
3,607
9,882
APPENDIX E
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
NORTH AMERICAN
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
Total
223,854
62,590
2,128
1,588
45,827
0
0
0
335,987
103,126
133,725
0
0
1,102
0
0
237,953
98,034
335,987
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes
a'
1959
30,726
12,827
(283)
870
3,428
0
0
0
47,568
12,957
30,597
0
0
0
0
0
43,554
4,014
47,568
26,786
11,652
378
0
8
0
0
0
38,824
12,824
14,820
0
0
1,102
0
0
28,746
10,078
38,824
33,864
10,405
136
0
0
0
0
0
44,405
16,030
19,759
0
0
0
0
0
35,789
8,616
44,405
1956
28,761
6,782
21
0
42,391
0
0
0
77,955
13,224
23,683
0
0
0
0
0
36,907
77,955
1955
32, 349
5,177
396
0
0
0
0
0
37,922
15,458
11,335
0
0
0
0
0
26,793
11,129
37,922
I mwww
APPENDIX E
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
NORTH AMERICAN (CONTINUED)
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2o
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
1954
22,180
4,832(163)
0
0
0
0
0
26,849
9,447
6,004
0
0
0
0
0
11, 398
26,849
1953
12,773
4,665
1,573
0
0
0
0
0
19,011
5,152
5,912
0
0
0
0
0
11,064
7,947
19,011
1952
7,821
2,745
18
0
0
0
0
0
10,584
4,294
7,416
0
0
0
0
0
11,710
1951
6,422
1,525
8
24
0
0
0
0
7,979
4,294
8,674
0
0
0
0
0
12,968
(1,126) (4,989)
10,584 7,979
1950
8,o86
913
22
0
0
0
0
0
9,021
4,293
1,068
0
0
0
0
0
5,361
3,660
9,021
1949
7,306
685
(6)
526
0
0
0
0
8,511
3 ,4352,388
0
0
0
0
0
5,823
2, 688
8,51l
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes
1948
6,780
382
28
168
0
0
0
0
7,358
1,718
2,069
0
0
0
0
0
3,787
3,571
7,358
ON
APPENDIX F
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS SUMMARY
SMALL FIRMS
Sources
1
la
2
2a,
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses
Total
244,537
86,287
7,289
15,625
18,152
87,151
4,247
2,335
465,623
1959
35,b39
21,593
554
3,513
4,404
10,288
1,430
422
77,843
1958
31,043
17,798
633
359
1,493
20,000
2,817
0
74,143
11,865
30,392
0
6,477
808
0
4,755
54,297
19,846
74,143
1957
30,310
11,095
668
45
277
14,387
0
0
56,782
11,786
52,441
0
0
2,823
0
1,526
68,576
(11,794)
56,782
1956
30,258
7,463
110
0
862
9,789
0
0
48,482
11,896
30,447
0
888
1,070
0
3,000
47,301
1,181
48,482
91,588
194,460
0
51,017
20,051
1,134
13,690
371,940
93,683
465,623
1955
39,337
6,412
68
11
349
0
0
0
46,177
10,948
7,647
0
888
417
0
859
20,459
25,718
46,177
12,333
31,425
0
8,138
8,219
0
1,430
61,545
16,298
77,843
Codes.
APPENDIX F
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS SUMMARY
SMALL FIRMS (CONTINUED)
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Use s
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
1954.
38,719
5,857
289
55
2,302
0
0
0
47,222
8,696
5,014
0
2,490
0
415
1,898
18,513
28,709
47,222
1953.
28,797
4,447
247
518
1,505
0
0
1,022
36,536
5,312
9,903
0
21,119
1,011
0
0
37,345
1952 1951
16,642 (10,156)
4,187
(131)
4,134
6,341
12,171
0
891
44,235
5,257
16,688
0
0
653
0
0
22,598
(809) 21,637
36,536 44,235
2,053
82
2,199
27
10,686
0
0
4,891
4,172
5,281
0
2,313
368
0
0
12,134
(7,243)
4,891
1950
12,140
1,710
117
171
582
2,822
0
0
17,542
5,034
1,784
0
37
4,297
0
0
11,152
6,390
17,542
1929 (194
3,925 (l2,117)
1,938
5,853
1,943
1
2,675
0
0
16,335
2,145
2,175
0
8,667
238
275
0
13,500
2,835
16,335
1,766
(562)
2,677
9
4,333
0
0
(3,894)
2,144
1,934
0
0
447
444
222
5,191
(9,085)
(3,894)
See preface to this Appendix for Sources 0oand Uses Codes.
APPENDIX G
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
GRUMMAN
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
Total-
71,102
15,755
(134)
504
0
4,025
0
891
92,143
43,850
32,467
0
0
740
444
3,875
81,376
10,767
92,143
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
1959-
4,939
2,953
22
0
0
4,025
0
0
11,939
3,300
12,834
0
0
0
0
0
16,134
(4,195)
11,939
1958
2,492
2,001
13
0
0
0
0
0
4,506
3,300
2,742
0
0
0
0
0
6,042
(1,536)
4,506
1957
5,236
1,795(77)
0
0
0
0
0
6,954
3,850
2,450
0
0
23
0
0
6,323
631
6,954
1955
9,757
1,436
9
0
0
0
0
0
11,202
4,000
1,872
0
0
60
0
165
6,097
5,105
11,202
7,702
1,614
45
0
0
0
0
0
9,361
4,400
3,521
0
0
140
0
3,000
11,061
(1,700)
9,361
APPENDIX G
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
GRUMMAN (CONTINUED)
1952 1951
Sources
1
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
11,215
1,371
200
55
0
0
0
0
12,841
7,129
1,218
18
21
0
0
0
0
8,386
5,349
1,114
4
0
0
0
0
891
7,358
Use s
7
8
9
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
5,000
2,201
0
0
0
0
710
7,911
4,930
12,841
4,000
1,146
0
0
0
0
0
5,146
3,240
8,386
4,000
1,424
0
0
171
0
0
5,595
1,763
773
47
0
0
0
0
0
6,276
4,000
2,097
0
0
55
0
0
124
6,276
1950
6,242
590
94
157
0
0
0
0
7,083
4,000
910
0
0
0
0
0
4,910
2,173
7,083
1949 1948
3,192
483
88
271
0
0
0
0
4,034
2,000
1,070
0
0
0
0
0
3,070
964
4,034
2,393
407(597)
0
0
0
0
0
2,203
2,000
200
0
0
291
444
0
2,935
(732)
2,203
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
-A1
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APPENDIX H
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
MARTIN
Sources
1
la.
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses
Total-
67,095
34,173
7,585
9,509
8,959
40,084
4,247
0
171,652
24,554
75,590
0
29,668
15,152
275
5,773
151,012
20,640
171,652
1959.
13,337
9,654
974
0
129
0
1,430
0
25,524
4,683
7,630
0
2,250
8,173
0
1,430
24,166
1,358
25,524
1958
11,726
8,650
555
168
35
20,000
2,817
0
43,951
4,676
11,828
0
0
0
0
2,817
19,321
24,630
43,951
9,879
4,738
635
0
179
0
0
0
15,431
4,674
28,635
0
0
2,705
0
1,526
37,540
(22,109)
15,431
1956
10, 840
1,865
25
0
563
0
0
0
13,293
4, 344
16,881
0
0
0
0
0
21,225
(7,932)
13,293
1955
13,285
1,643
10
0
174
0
0
0
15,112
3,856
2,076
0
0
0
0
0
5,932
9,180
15,112
Codes. '-
APPENDIX H
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
MARTIN (CONTINUED)
1953 1952
Sources
1931 1950 1949
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
20,052
1,538
15
0
1,851
0
0
0
23,456
2,321
693
0
0
0
0
0
3,014
20,442
23,456
15,095
1,150
67
497
1,349
0
0
0
18,158
0
3,7b4
0
18,751
0
0
0
22,535
5,808 (22,179)
1,078
(540)
4,004
4,679
4,368
0
0
19,397
0
382
0
0
0
0
0
382
802
26
2,199
0
10,686
0
0
(8,466)
0
1,623
0
0
0
0
0
1,623
(4,377) 19,015 (10,089)
18,158 19,397 (8,466)
3,128
766
18
0
0
697
0
0
4,609
0
470
0
0
4,274
0
0
4,744
(135)
4,609
2,835 (16,711)
1,155
5,765
815
0
0
0
0
10,570
0
243
0
8,667
0
275
0
1,345
1,385 (10,728)
10,570
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
194.8
1,134
35
1,826
0
4,333
0
0
(9,383)
0
1,345
0
0
0
0
a
(9,383)
r9
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APPENDIX I
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
MCDONNELL
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
Total
61,479
24,234
522
391
802
21,471
0
0
108,899
8,712
55,870
0
15,516
1,059
0
1,882
83,039
25,860
108,899
1958.
10,038
5,599
1
0
0
0
0
0
15,638
1,680
6,340
0
5,888
46
0
0
13,954
1,684
15,638
10,029
4,426
5
191
0
0
0
0
14,651
1,399
12,133
0
5,888
0
0
0
19,420
(4,769)
14,651
9,672
2,955
10
45
0
14,112
0
0
26,794
828
12,997
0
0
0
0
0
13,325
12,969
26,794
See Preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
1956 19 5
4,556
2,518
0
11
0
0
0
0
7,085
720
1,371
0
888
0
0
694
3,673
3,412
7,085
6,751
2,888
5
0
0
0
0
0
9,644
746
3,140
0
888
14
0
0
4,788
4,856
9,644
7
APPENDIX I
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
MCDONNELL (CONTINUED)
1954
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
3,622
2,326
9
0
171
0
0
0
6,128
703
1,496
0
888
14
0
1,188
4,289
1,839
6,128
1953 1952
4,234
1,485
73
0
18
0
0
0
684
4,010
0
1,001
454
0
0
6,149
(339)
5,810
3,064
1,655
405
130
3
7,134
0
0
12,391
682
12,306
0
0
0
0
0
12,988
(597)
12,391
1951
3,291
207
9
0
27
0
0
0
3,534
172
1,190
0
38
137
0
0
1,537
1,997
3,534
1950 1949
2,815
108
5
14
582
0
0
0
3,524
1,034
276
0
37
0
0
0
1,347
2,177
3,524
1,732
55
0
0
1
225
0
0
2,013
32
543
0
0
238
0
0
813
1,200
2,013
See preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
1948
1,675
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,687
32
68
0
0
156
0
0
256
1,687
APPENDIX J
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
NORTHROP (CONTINUED)
Sources
1
la
2
2a
2b
2c
3
4
5
6
Total Sources
1954
3,380
622
65
0
280
0
0
0
4,797
1953
2,339
594
89
0
138
0
0
1,022
4,182
Uses
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total Uses
Net Working Capital
GRAND TOTAL
672
624
0
1,602
401
0
0
3,299
1,498
4,797
628
963
0
1,367
557
0
0
3,515
667
4,182
1952 1951 1950 1949 1948
2,421
340
0
0
1,659
669
0
0
5,089
575
2,576
0
0
482
0
0
3,633
1,456
5,089
3,276
271
0
0
0
0
0
0
3,547
0
371
0
2,275
176
0
0
2,822
725
3,547
(45)
246
0
0
0
2,125
0
0
2,326
0
128
0
0
23
0
0
151
2,175
2,326
(3,834)
245
0
857
0
2,450
0
0
526
213
0
851
9
0
0
0
(282)
113
319
0
0
0
0
0
432
(714)
(282)
112
321
0
0
0
0
222
655
944
1,599
See Preface to this Appendix for Sources and Uses Codes.
0%
